

# **Mozambique**

## **Mid-Term Evaluation**

## **Thematic window: Environment and Climate Change**

## Programme Title: Environmental Mainstreaming & Adaptation to Climate Change in Mozambique

Author: Vincent Lefebvre, Consultant

#### **Prologue**

The current mid-term evaluation report is part of the efforts being implemented by the Millennium Development Goal Secretariat (MDG-F), as part of its monitoring and evaluation strategy, to promote learning and to improve the quality of the 128 joint programs in 8 development thematic windows according to the basic evaluation criteria inherent to evaluation; relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

The aforementioned mid-term evaluations have been carried out amidst the backdrop of an institutional context that is both rich and varied, and where several UN organizations, working hand in hand with governmental agencies and civil society, cooperate in an attempt to achieve priority development objectives at the local, regional, and national levels. Thus the mid-term evaluations have been conducted in line with the principles outlined in the Evaluation network of the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) - as well as those of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). In this respect, the evaluation process included a reference group comprising the main stakeholders involved in the joint programme, who were active participants in decisions making during all stages of the evaluation; design, implementation, dissemination and improvement phase.

The analysis contained in the mid-term evaluation focuses on the joint program at its mid-term point of implementation- approximately 18 months after it was launched. Bearing in mind the limited time period for implementation of the programs (3 years at most), the mid-term evaluations have been devised to serve as short-term evaluation exercises. This has limited the scope and depth of the evaluation in comparison to a more standard evaluation exercise that would take much longer time and resources to be conducted. Yet it is clearly focusing on the utility and use of the evaluation as a learning tool to improve the joint programs and widely disseminating lessons learnt.

This exercise is both a first opportunity to constitute an independent 'snapshot' of progress made and the challenges posed by initiatives of this nature as regards the 3 objectives being pursued by the MDG-F; the change in living conditions for the various populations vis-à-vis the Millennium Development Goals, the improved quality in terms of assistance provided in line with the terms and conditions outlined by the Declaration of Paris as well as progress made regarding the reform of the United Nations system following the "Delivering as One" initiative.

As a direct result of such mid-term evaluation processes, plans aimed at improving each joint program have been drafted and as such, the recommendations contained in the report have now become specific initiatives, seeking to improve upon implementation of all joint programs evaluated, which are closely monitored by the MDG-F Secretariat.

Conscious of the individual and collective efforts deployed to successfully perform this mid-term evaluation, we would like to thank all partners involved and to dedicate this current document to all those who have contributed to the drafting of the same and who have helped it become a reality (members of the reference group, the teams comprising the governmental agencies, the joint program team, consultants, beneficiaries, local authorities, the team from the Secretariat as well as a wide range of institutions and individuals from the public and private sectors). Once again, our heartfelt thanks.

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation report do not necessarily reflect the views of the MDG-F Secretariat.



## MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE PROGRAMME: "ENVIRONMENTAL MAINSTREAMING & ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN MOZAMBIQUE"

**FINAL REPORT** 

VINCENT LEFEBVRE

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## **PROGRAMME CHECK-LIST<sup>1</sup>**

Programme title	"Environmental ma	instreaming & adaptation to climate change in Mozambique"		
Programme ID	MDG-F 1681			
Basic data	Starting date : 09/2008	Expected closure date : 08/2011	Budget (\$) o	over 3 years
Government partners a Disaster Management Communications	Institute, National Meteorology Insti	of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, National tute, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Transport and		
Covered area : Chicua	lacuala district (Gaza province) - 18.	115km <sup>2</sup>		
			Agency budget	7.060.001
Component 1 : Env	vironmental mainstreaming			<u>2.076.795</u>
Outcome 1: Government, civil	Output 1.1 Environmental priorities and indicators reflected	<b>Indicator</b> ( <i>responsible agencies</i> ): Four climate change adaptation policy briefs developed and discussed per year ( <i>UNDP</i> , <i>UN-UNDP</i> )	FAO UN- HABITAT	85.500 18.000
society,	in planning frameworks and	HABITAT)	UNDP	80.000
communities and	budgets at district and community	<b>Indicator</b> : Climate change issues included into 2 national plans and/or strategies ( <i>WFP</i> , <i>UNDP</i> , <i>FAO</i> )	WFP subtotal	30.000 213.500
other stakeholders informed, sensitized and empowered on environment and	levels (guidelines to integrate CC in district development plans & elaboration of a district plan integrating CC)			213.300
climate change	Output 1.2 : GIS based data &	Indicator: Five thematic district maps produced with information	UNEP WFP	100.000
issues	maps on climate change vulnerability for risk areas in the Limpopo River Basin	on risk factors ( <i>WFP</i> ) <b>Indicator</b> : Climate change information and statistics collected and recorded ( <i>WFP</i> )	subtotal	212.000
	<b>Output 1.3</b> : Training programmes on disaster and	<b>Indicator</b> : Diagnostic tools on the application and use of climate change information ( <i>UNDP</i> )	UN- HABITAT UNDP	60.000
	climate change prediction for	Indicator: Training programmes developed and implemented	WFP	35.000
	early warning purposes	jointly with UNDP / GEF "coping with drought and climate change" project ( <i>UNDP</i> ) <b>Indicator</b> : Local leadership training programmes integrated with sustainable land use methodologies ( <i>UN-HABITAT</i> ) <b>Indicator</b> : ToT courses implemented ( <i>UN-HABITAT</i> ) <b>Indicator</b> : One district using maps & information for planning purposes ( <i>WFP</i> )	subtotal	155.000
	Output 1.4 : Knowledge and	<b>Indicator</b> : At least 3 field days organized targeting 8 communities	FAO UNEP	82.200 24.000
	experience sharing between stakeholders (UN agencies and	per year (all agencies)	UN- HABITAT	19.000
	beneficiaries)		UNDP WFP	65.000 5.000
			subtotal	195.000
Outcome 2:	Output 2.1 : National Disaster	Indicator: environmentally conscious disaster reduction plans	FAO	91.600
Government capacity at central &	Preparedness plan updated to include climate change &	prepared and updated on a yearly basis (UNEP, UN-HABITAT, WFP, FAO)	UNEP UN- HABITAT	230.000 60.000
decentralized levels	environmental aspects	Indicator: Two training events per year for Government staff in	WFP	17.000
strengthened to implement		participatory planning including environmental and climate change risks issues ( <i>UNEP</i> , <i>UN-HABITAT</i> , <i>WFP</i> , <i>FAO</i> ) <b>Indicator</b> : Presentation of results of vulnerability & disaster risk	subtotal	398.600

<sup>1</sup> As per original PRODOC



environmental		assessment (UN-HABITAT, WFP, FAO)		
policies		<b>Indicator</b> : Presentation of results of vulnerability & disaster risk		
poneies		assessment (UN-HABITAT, WFP, FAO)		
	Output 2.2 : Early warning &	Indicator: gaps in local communication capacities identified &	UN-	8.000
	communication system in Gaza	filled (UN-HABITAT, UNDP)	HABITAT UNIDO	94.695
1	province	Indicator: energy requirements of communications system	subtotal	102.695
	1	assessed & identified (UNIDO)	Subtotal	102.070
	Output 2.3 : Authorities, civil	<b>Indicator</b> : civil society representatives trained (TV, newspapers,	FAO	100.000
1	society trained to incorporate &	national & regional radios) (UNEP, UNDP, FAO)	UNEP	70.000
1	report on climate change risks	Indicator: educative entertainment material produced for	UN- HABITAT	60.000
1	events	community awareness on climate change & disaster risk (UN-	UNDP	260.000
1		HABITAT, UNDP)	subtotal	490.000
		Indicator: completed study on contribution of natural resources		
1		impacts of climate change on provincial economy (UNEP, UNDP,		
1		FAO) Indicator: Government & local NGOs trained on the use of		
		climate information (UNDP)		
Outcome 3: Climate	Output 3.1 : development of	Indicator: document on the use of climate proofing tools	UNEP	150.000
proofing	tools for climate proofing of risk			
methodology	zones in the Limpopo Basin			
mainstreamed into	Output 3.2 : assessment of	Indicator: cost-benefit analysis of implementation of climate	UNEP	160.000
stakeholders	climate proofing approaches	proofing activities (UNEP, UN-HABITAT)		
policies,		<b>Indicator</b> : three awareness workshops for policy makers conducted in 2008 ( <i>UNEP</i> )		
programming, etc.				
Component 2 : Ada	aptation to climate change			4.855.006
Outcome 4:	Output 4.1 : inventory &	Indicator: methodology for assessing climate change coping	FAO UNEP	141.202
Community coping	implementation assessment of	mechanisms (UNEP, WFP, FAO)	UN-	8.000
mechanisms to	climate proofing approaches	<b>Indicator</b> : baseline document prepared by mid-2008 ( <i>UNDP</i> , <i>UNEP</i> , <i>WFP</i> , <i>FAO</i> )	HABITAT	
climate change		<b>Indicator</b> : strategy applying & implementing climate friendly	UNDP WFP	20.000 40.000
enhanced		coping mechanisms by 2008 (UNEP, UN-HABITAT)	subtotal	369.202
1		Indicator: Three communities supported to implement and		
1		reinforce coping mechanism by mid-2010 (UNEP, UN-HABITAT,		
1		WFP)		
1		Indicator: capacity needs assessment carried out (UNDP, UNEP)	E40	202.000
1	Output 4.2 : community based	<b>Indicator</b> : community areas with DUAT by end of 2008 ( <i>FAO</i> , <i>UN-HABITAT</i> )	FAO	383.800
	natural forest resources	<b>Indicator</b> : community committees & associations established and		
	management system established	legalized by end of 2008 (FAO)		
		Indicator: forest inventories and management plans by end of		
1		2008 (FAO)		
			UN-HAB.	260.000
l	Output 4.3 : territorial planning	Indicator: Territorial planning strategy encompassing climate	UN-IIAD.	
	mechanisms introduced at	change & disaster risk reduction tools	UN-HAD.	
		change & disaster risk reduction tools Indicator: local building codes and standards reviewed	UN-HAD.	
	mechanisms introduced at	change & disaster risk reduction tools Indicator: local building codes and standards reviewed Indicator: Programme on shelter, roof reinforcement developed	UN-HAB.	
	mechanisms introduced at	change & disaster risk reduction tools Indicator: local building codes and standards reviewed	UN-HAD.	
	mechanisms introduced at community level	change & disaster risk reduction tools <b>Indicator</b> : local building codes and standards reviewed <b>Indicator</b> : Programme on shelter, roof reinforcement developed and implemented at community level <b>Indicator</b> : participatory planning implemented in E. Mondlane & Mapai		
	mechanisms introduced at community level Output 4.4 : agro-forestry	<ul> <li>change &amp; disaster risk reduction tools</li> <li>Indicator: local building codes and standards reviewed</li> <li>Indicator: Programme on shelter, roof reinforcement developed and implemented at community level</li> <li>Indicator: participatory planning implemented in E. Mondlane &amp; Mapai</li> <li>Indicator: vegetation survey by end of 2008 (FAO)</li> </ul>	FAO	179.090
	mechanisms introduced at community level Output 4.4 : agro-forestry practices introduced & applied at	<ul> <li>change &amp; disaster risk reduction tools</li> <li>Indicator: local building codes and standards reviewed</li> <li>Indicator: Programme on shelter, roof reinforcement developed and implemented at community level</li> <li>Indicator: participatory planning implemented in E. Mondlane &amp; Mapai</li> <li>Indicator: vegetation survey by end of 2008 (FAO)</li> <li>Indicator: three pilot tree nurseries by 04/2009 (FAO)</li> </ul>	FAO UNDP	179.090 175.000
	mechanisms introduced at community level Output 4.4 : agro-forestry	<ul> <li>change &amp; disaster risk reduction tools</li> <li>Indicator: local building codes and standards reviewed</li> <li>Indicator: Programme on shelter, roof reinforcement developed and implemented at community level</li> <li>Indicator: participatory planning implemented in E. Mondlane &amp; Mapai</li> <li>Indicator: vegetation survey by end of 2008 (FAO)</li> <li>Indicator: three pilot tree nurseries by 04/2009 (FAO)</li> <li>Indicator: agro-forestry practices demonstrated &amp; in use by</li> </ul>	FAO UNDP WFP	179.090 175.000 9.000
	mechanisms introduced at community level Output 4.4 : agro-forestry practices introduced & applied at local level	<ul> <li>change &amp; disaster risk reduction tools</li> <li>Indicator: local building codes and standards reviewed</li> <li>Indicator: Programme on shelter, roof reinforcement developed and implemented at community level</li> <li>Indicator: participatory planning implemented in E. Mondlane &amp; Mapai</li> <li>Indicator: vegetation survey by end of 2008 (<i>FAO</i>)</li> <li>Indicator: three pilot tree nurseries by 04/2009 (<i>FAO</i>)</li> <li>Indicator: agro-forestry practices demonstrated &amp; in use by project's end (<i>FAO</i>, WFP, UNDP)</li> </ul>	FAO UNDP	179.090 175.000
	mechanisms introduced at community level Output 4.4 : agro-forestry practices introduced & applied at	<ul> <li>change &amp; disaster risk reduction tools</li> <li>Indicator: local building codes and standards reviewed</li> <li>Indicator: Programme on shelter, roof reinforcement developed and implemented at community level</li> <li>Indicator: participatory planning implemented in E. Mondlane &amp; Mapai</li> <li>Indicator: vegetation survey by end of 2008 (FAO)</li> <li>Indicator: three pilot tree nurseries by 04/2009 (FAO)</li> <li>Indicator: agro-forestry practices demonstrated &amp; in use by</li> </ul>	FAO UNDP WFP subtotal	179.090 175.000 9.000 363.090



	management systems created	<b>Indicator</b> : improved capacity to assess water related climate change (UNEP)	subtotal	1.069.170
	<b>Output 4.6</b> : sustainable conservation agriculture practices introduced & efficiency in small scale irrigation systems improved	<b>Indicator</b> : map of soil suitability and land use for agricultural activities produced by mid-2008 ( <i>FAO</i> ) <b>Indicator</b> : conservation agriculture practices adopted in over 10 communities by project's end ( <i>FAO</i> , <i>WFP</i> )	FAO	581.400
		<ul> <li>Indicator: over 50 farmers trained on irrigation systems use on a yearly basis (<i>FAO</i>)</li> <li>Indicator: irrigation systems extended to at least 2 communities by early 2009 (<i>FAO</i>, UNIDO)</li> </ul>	UNIDO	86.831
			UNIDO	86.831
			WFP	12.000
			subtotal	680.231
	Output 4.7 : analysis of biogas	Indicator: sites & available sources for waste production mapped	FAO	92.950
	generation & composting using	in the Limpopo River Basin by 2008's end (UNIDO, FAO)	UN-	20.000
	manure as coping mechanism to	Indicator: over 5 selected demonstration sites established using	HABITAT UNIDO	159.109
	climate change	waste management including manure, hides, solid waste (UNIDO, FAO, UN-HABITAT)	subtotal	272.059
Outcome 5:	Output 5.1 : options for	Indicator: document on generic livelihoods diversification	FAO	65.600
Communities'	livelihoods diversification	disaggregated by sex prepared by mid 2008 (FAO, UNEP, WFP)	UNEP WFP	50.000 12.000
livelihoods options	identified	Indicator: feasibility studies of selected livelihoods diversification	subtotal	12.000
diversified		options by end of 2008 ( <i>UNEP</i> , FAO, UNIDO) <b>Indicator</b> : three communities trained and assisted with suitable livelihoods options ( <i>WFP</i> )	Subtotai	
	Output 5.2 : inventory &	Indicator: renewable energy sources documented by mid-2008	FAO	80.300
	feasibility assessment of potential	(UNIDO)	UN- HABITAT	57.000
	renewable energy sources carried	Indicator: over 5 demonstration sites using renewable energy	UNIDO	414.860
	out	sources (UNIDO)	WFP	3.000
		<ul> <li>Indicator: improved stoves in 5 communities (UNIDO, WFP, UN-HABITAT)</li> <li>Indicator: training programme on management &amp; use of renewable energy sources &amp; technologies (UNIDO)</li> <li>Indicator: 50 stakeholders (incl.50% women) trained on use of renewable energy sources &amp; technologies by 2008's end (UNIDO)</li> </ul>	subtotal	555.160
	Output 5.3 : animal husbandry	Indicator: basic cattle infrastructures build in communities (FAO,	FAO	394.800
	grazing and veterinary service coverage improved	UNIDO) Indicator: livestock mortalities reduced by over 25% (FAO) Indicator: over 4 livestock training workshops conducted on best practices (FAO)	UNIDO subtotal	43.335 438.135
	Output 5.4 : agro-processing &	Indicator: meat processing established & business plans	FAO	182.800
	marketing activities developed	implemented (FAO, UNIDO)	UNIDO	80.999
		<b>Indicator</b> : over 3 training sessions on food processing / transformation covering min. 100 beneficiaries (incl. 50% women) ( <i>FAO</i> , <i>UNIDO</i> )	subtotal	263.799
	<b>Output 5.5</b> : use of animal traction promoted to encourage land preparation & transport	<b>Indicator</b> : over 200 farmers trained on animal traction on a yearly basis	FAO	72.760
			FAO	36%
			UNEP	19%
			UNDP	17%
			UNIDO	15%
			UNDP	10%
			WFP	4%



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## **Executive Summary**

While Mozambique is still considered as one of the poorest countries in the world, it has over the past 15 years experienced one of the highest growth rates of Africa, resulting in substantial poverty reduction. Nonetheless, poverty levels are very variable within the country as is the population density. In particular, the interior of the South of Mozambique covering the Gaza and Inhambane provinces is sparsely populated with a high level of poverty. Further to this, that region is prone to extreme climatic events in the form of droughts and floods, and its natural resource basis is rapidly deteriorating itself because of unsustainable exploitation of natural resources such as timber, grazing lands, charcoal production. The combination of the two results in increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters affecting seriously the livelihoods of the population.

In that context, the United Nations in Mozambique formulated a 7 million dollar Joint Program financed by the Millennium Development Goal Fund to support the Chicualacuala district in the Gaza province with climate change adaptation and environmental mainstreaming.

The objectives of the program are to 1. <u>Streamline climate change adaptation</u> within local, provincial and national decision making processes and 2. <u>Strengthen the coping mechanisms</u> of local populations to extreme climatic and environmental events.

The programme is being implemented by 6 UN agencies (FAO as the Joint Program Coordinator), UNDP, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNIDO, WFP) in collaboration with Governmental institutions (MICOA as the Joint Program Coordinator counterpart, MINAG, INGC, INAM, MINER, MTC). In addition, program staff works in close collaboration with district & provincial state representatives and final beneficiaries associations.

The programme implementation started in September 2008 for 3 years and as per requirement of MDG-F's Secretariat, a mid-term assessment was due to be carried out around mid 2010.

The objectives of this evaluation were to provide direct stakeholders and the MDG-F Secretariat information in order to make an independent assessment on the performance of the programme. In particular, the consultant was to analyze in detail the design quality and coherence of the programme components, the programme management model, the programme effectiveness and contribution to the objectives of environment & climate change, and MDGs at both local and national levels.

The evaluator used a combination of direct and indirect data acquisition techniques (individual interviews, gender specific interviews, group interviews, documentary review, on-site review of programme achievements) and tried to cover as much as possible the entire range of stakeholders (UN partners, national / provincial /district state institutions, NGOs, final beneficiaries) and programme areas & sectors (agriculture, water, rural development, environment, renewable energy, rural infrastructures, capacity building, policy making) given the limited timeframe (less than 2 weeks).

#### Findings:

In terms of design, the programme formulation initially considered more populated areas with already UN presence and relatively good road access. Nonetheless, the final choice of the programme area fell for a large district near the Zimbabwean border which has received so far very little donor support: Chicualacuala district.



Due to the remoteness of the district, lack of basic conditions and need to supervise activities in Maputo as well, the coordination unit was set up mid-way in Chókwè. The Programme Coordinator combines as well the function of FAO technical assistant: this enables him to have an in-depth knowledge of the programme but also sparks confusion in terms of visibility for both the UN partners and beneficiaries (institutional or final ones). The Coordinator reports to the Programme Management Committee taking various decisions in the absence of a functional programme steering committee. The authorities are slowly but more increasingly participating in the PMC with suggestions to amend the programme in order to follow more closely the GOM priorities (e.g. INAM weather station to monitor more efficiently weather patterns in the district, INGC's CERUM to increase disaster preparedness and increase divulgation of climate proofing methods, community fish tanks to diversify food sources).

The programme design took into consideration the national priorities (within PARPA II and NAPA) in terms of both climate change adaptation and poverty reduction through adaptation of coping mechanisms and livelihood diversification.

A holistic approach was adopted as well to increase efficiency: each activity is carried out by the most appropriate UN agency; it resulted in a loss of focus on results as these were to be achieved by many UN partners with systematic delays as the input of one agency was depending on the completion of activities from another agency in order to achieve programme results.

This is due to a combination of factors: highly bureaucratic tender procedures in Mozambique, remoteness of the programme area and lack of working conditions, short programme duration. However, the tedious bureaucratic procedures are the most constraining factor slowing down the implementation of the programme with systematic delays in the provision of goods and services.

In that respect, the programme can be considered as relatively inefficient with the implementation delays that resulted from the adopted programme approach, in addition to the difficulties of programme implementation in a remote area. Finally, this approach impacts as well the institutional beneficiaries which, for a single result, must deal with 3 or 4 UN partners.

The programme is slipping behind schedule especially for the following activities: Chicualacuala weather station, CERUM construction, integrated water management, renewable energy for irrigation water, slaughterhouse.

While many programme themes, activities are fairly conventional (e.g. environmental trainings, water drilling, agricultural intensification or extension), other are not (climate change policy making, local environmental management, renewable energy). Actually the combination of these to cover climate change and improved livelihoods of populations is ground braking. The intervention should be considered more as a pilot programme than a development programme.

The ownership of the program by authorities is variable: weak for MICOA, MINAG and MINER, and strong for INGC, INAM, district authorities. More locally, at district and provincial levels, the programme enabled a wide participation of institutional stakeholders, above all for the production of soft results (some studies, planning, capacity building, policy making, etc.). There is a good ownership by the final beneficiaries (farmers) but it is the difference in viewing their environment and natural resource basis between recently exposed communities and communities involved since the beginning of the programme that is striking: one can see the effectiveness of combining many different types of activities within a 'CC adaptation' or 'Environmental streamlining' development package as is this programme. The final beneficiaries showed very little interest for tree nurseries (in



particular timber) despite trainings and awareness campaigns on reforestation but showed some interest for fruit trees.

There is little common monitoring between authorities and the UN partners or the Coordination - in addition the UN Coordination counterpart (MICOA) is absent, not functional - ; this combined with the apparent lack of concrete on-site results after one and a half year (implementation delays mentioned above) prompted the creation of a parallel monitoring system by authorities which evidenced a lack of trust between them and the UN partners.

Promising activities that might become success stories are the following: combination of renewable energy and drinking water, communal rainwater harvesting systems, livestock promoters' network combined with proximity livestock pharmacy, combination of fish farming & small livestock. It might be too early to start divulging these as there are not yet completed or tested comprehensively.

MICOA's role as a coordinating counterpart is currently negligible. Still, it has the potential to support the coordination unit, facilitate the divulgation of successful activities through the communication channels of the state and contribute to the elaboration of a communication strategy.

An advocacy strategy is required by the MDG-F to divulge the goals and objectives of the programme and is embedded within the programme under several outputs. In addition, UN partners are on an adhoc basis divulging some programme results to governmental institutions in order to facilitate the ownership and empowerment of the newly produced methodologies or methods developed under the programme (e.g. CC adaptation mainstreaming, guidelines, etc.).

Sustainability of the program results is likely to happen for environmental or CC adaptation mainstreaming through government empowerment if divulgation activities are indeed successful. It might be much more difficult for climate proofing or livelihood diversification activities as these require long term support to communities while the programme duration is very short (barely 3 years), district government means insufficient and other donors' presence inexistent. This is why it is important to finalise INGC's CERUM as it might serve as a demonstration platform of new activities and methodologies with regards to livelihood diversification and climate proofing.

Three MDG goals are likely to be affected within the district: eradication of extreme poverty through sustainable agriculture, agro-forestry and improved livestock activities (MDG1), environmental sustainability with CC adaptation mainstreaming and climate proofing and the adoption of more sustainable behaviours for natural resource exploitation (MDG7), and global partnership with the adoption of energy efficient techniques (solar panels) (MDG8).

In 2008, at the time of the programme formulation, the UN initiative "Delivering as One" was being conceptualised. This programme adopted several key principles like jointness or holistic approach to development, which resulted in a PRODOC with a very complex division of responsibilities between UN partners and resulting in common implementation. This approach is not likely to be successful in a highly bureaucratic environment such the UN with partners having different ways of implementing activities. It might be wiser to consider jointness not so deeply at activity level but only at planning, monitoring or evaluation levels. Therefore, common implementation between UN partners should be avoided in the future.

The programme visibility has been negatively affected by the choice to combine in one person both programme coordination and UN partner technical assistance.



#### Conclusions:

The programme design was not adapted to the specific conditions of the chosen district: it was too complex, not focussing on well tested routine activities (in terms of development) given the implementation difficulties that should have been foreseen due to the remoteness of the programme area. In addition, future JP formulation processes should need more time to allow programme nurturing until a consensus is reached in term of concepts, designs, ways of implementation between all major stakeholders.

In a bureaucratic environment, a holistic approach is not one of the best options: individual implementation but common formulation, programming, monitoring & evaluation are more sensible to increase development aid efficiency.

The UN procurement procedures in Mozambique are becoming a major hurdle for smooth programme implementation. It is possibly the main factor slowing the programme implementation, resulting in major delays, which might require downscaling or reformulation of some activities. This issue needs to be recognised at the highest level.

Given the pilot nature of the programme, it should be viewed in a different manner in term of approach: it is more important to test new ways of dealing with CC adaptation, new methods or methodologies on how to combine classical rural development activities to strengthen population livelihoods, than prioritise large scale impact (which could be the goal of future interventions in the same project area).

The programme should be considered as well as a milestone in Mozambique for development aid related to climate change adaptation and environmental mainstreaming.

#### Recommendations:

The short duration (3 years) of MDG-F programmes makes the steering of the programmes relatively difficult above all while barely 1 year remains before completion.

In this particular programme, the UN procurement rules or the choice of programme area (remoteness) are fixed factors.

Still, if implementation continues without any change of method, delays will simply continue to add up; therefore, planning for year 3 should focus on acceleration of implementation by modifying the following factors:

- 1. Improving the working conditions of programme staff on-site: e.g. permanent power for working hours
- 2. Adjust the budget and activities per UN partner so that the implementation is smoother and not impeded by cascading delays of UN partners for one single result: activities requiring long procurement procedures should be definitely discarded and a reallocation of activities and corresponding budgets per UN partner should be decided during a PMC.

In addition some specific activities should be implemented and / or completed rapidly like year 2 delayed activities (cisterns, solar panels), climate proofing, district land use plan & water resources plan.

With regards to improving the working relationship between institutional stakeholders and the UN partners, the following actions might be considered:

- Empowerment of Government stakeholders should be improved so that if a reallocation of activities is eventually decided as mentioned above, local Government priorities are clearly reflected in year 3 activities (following their newly formulated PEDD).



- Permanent UN programme staff in Chicualacuala should move to SDAE premises (office space permitting)
- Use local expertise for backstopping (e.g. agricultural research, renewable energy specialists)
- Create a closer working relationship between the programme coordination unit and its counterpart by moving asap to MICOA proposed premises and discussing how it might support the coordination unit for some specific activities like an advocacy and communication plan or divulging within the state institutions successful activities or methods ; in that case, MICOA could support the coordination unit in improving the programme visibility
- MICOA's involvement in this programme as a coordination counterpart has been very weak: the RCO and its counterpart (Environment Minister) should review MICOA's role in this programme so that its mandate and/or responsibilities are more clearly stated or even redefined for year 3
- Monitor jointly (coordination unit, government stakeholders, UN partners) the implementation rate of the programme through two or three monthly visits

The pilot nature of the programme requires proper testing of new activities or combination of activities like climate proofing, CC adaptation mainstreaming; in that case, a 6 months extension might be considered to enable proper monitoring, full testing and divulgation.

Finally, the implementation of the programme has been undermined by the complexity of UN procurement rules which caused systematic delays and might still affect negatively the programme achievements. As this issue seems to be rampant for all JP, the RCO might initiate a reflexion workshop / forum on the UN procurement system leading in the medium or long term to a reform of the Mozambique UN procurement system. In the short term, temporary measures might include systematic and periodic (annually) trainings of UN staff dealing with tender preparations.



#### LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASAP	As soon as possible	
CC	Climate Change	
CERUM	Centro de Recursos e de Usos Multiplos / Multiple Uses and Resources Centre	
CRISTAL	Community-based Risk Screening Tool – Adaptation and Livelihoods	
CRTC	Centro de Recursos sobre Tecnologia e Ciências / Resource Centre for Technology and	
	Science	
DNER	Direcção Nacional de Energias Novas e Renováveis / National Directorate for	
	Renewable Energy	
DPA	Direcção Provincial de Agricultura / Provincial Directorate for Agriculture	
DPCA	Direcção Provincial de Coordenação Ambiental / Provincial Directorate for	
	Environmental Coordination	
DSA	Daily Subsistance Allowance	
DUAT	Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento de Terra / Right of Use and Benefit to Land	
EPAP	Equipe Provincial de Planificação / Provincial Planning Team	
ETD	<i>Equipe Técnico Distrital</i> / District Technical Team	
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations	
FFW	Food For Work	
GOM	Government Of Mozambique	
HDI	Human Development Index	
HR	Human Resources	
IIAM	Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçambique / Agriculture Research Institute of	
	Mozambique	
INAM	Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia / Meteorology National Institute	
INCAJU	Instituto de Fomento do Caju / Cashew Institute	
INGC	Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades / National Institute for Disaster	
	Management	
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature	
LOA	Letter Of Agreement	
MDG-f	Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund	
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation	
MICOA	Ministério para a Coordinação da Acção Ambiental / Ministry for Coordination of	
	Environmental Actions	
MINAG	Ministério de Agricultura / Ministry of Agriculture	
MINER	Ministério de Energia / Ministry of Energy	
MPD	Ministério de Planificação e Desenvolvimento / Ministry of Planning and Development	
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund	
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action	
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation	
NSC	National Steering Committee	
PECODA	Programa de Educação, Comunicação e Divulgação Ambiental / Programme of	
	Environmental Education, Communication and Diffusion	
PEDD	Plano Estratégico Distrital de Desenvolvimento / Strategic Development Plan for the	



	District	
PMC	Programme Management Committee	
PRODOC	Programme document	
RANET	Radio and Internet Technology	
RCO	Resident Coordinator Office (of the United Nations)	
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Accessible, Realistic, Time specific	
SPA	Serviço Provincial de Agricultura / Agriculture Provincial Service	
SDAE	Serviço Distrital de Actividades Económicas / District Department for Economic	
	Activities	
TOR	Terms Of Reference	
UNAC	União Nacional dos Camponeses / National Farmers Trade Union	
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework	
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme	
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme	
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation	
UNJP	United Nations Joint Programme	
WFP	World Food Program	



## 1. Introduction

#### 1.1. Background, context, program objectives

1. Although Mozambique has experienced a nearly double digit growth rate since the mid-90s, resulting in a reduction of extreme poverty to around 55%, it is rated 172th on the  $UNDP^2$ HDI<sup>3</sup> (data 2009), still considered as one of the poorest countries in the world. The poverty levels are not at all homogenous in the country, highest in little populated rural areas. The south of Mozambique is characterised by a high contrast of population density between the coastline highly populated and the interior with little population except along the major rivers. The interior considered as semi-arid receives as little as 400 mm on a yearly basis (Pafuri station- Chicualacula district), gradually increasing to 800-1000 mm (Maputo, Xai Xai, Inhambane) along the coast which is dry tropical.

In relation to its population, it has more than doubled (+250%) over the past 25 years.

2. The region is highly vulnerable to climate change due to a combination of natural factors such as high temperature, erratic rainfall patterns associated with El Niño Southern Oscillation and tropical storms/cyclones, and anthropogenic factors which include among others overgrazing and bushfires, rapid deforestation for charcoal production and timber. This has resulted during the past two decades in increased frequency of natural disasters such as severe droughts, cyclones and floods which are testing to the limit the ability of the local population to cope with these events.

The interior of the south of Mozambique, particularly the Gaza and Maputo provinces, is also nearly on a yearly basis prone to drought. In this context, the usual coping mechanisms to disasters rely heavily on both migration and unsustainable use of natural resources.

- 3. In this context, the United Nations in Mozambique took advantage of the Spanish funded MDG-f<sup>4</sup> mechanism to propose in 2008 a Joint Programme on climate change adaptation and environmental mainstreaming for the country. The initiative was to improve the resilience of the population with regards to natural disasters including capacity building of all institutional stakeholders to take into account climate change and environment in policy making, and to decrease poverty levels through a combination of activities which reduce the anthropogenic pressure on natural resources and increase their independence from natural hazards.
- 4. The objectives of this program are twofold: 1. Mainstream environment and climate change adaptation within the decision making processes at local, regional and national levels and 2. Strengthen the coping mechanisms of local populations. A strong emphasis has been put on 3 sectors: environment, agriculture and water.
- 5. Six UN<sup>5</sup> agencies are implementing this Joint Program: FAO<sup>6</sup> as a coordinating/leader agency, UNDP, UNEP<sup>7</sup>, UN-HABITAT<sup>8</sup>, UNIDO<sup>9</sup>, and WFP<sup>10</sup>). These collaborate with

<sup>5</sup> United Nations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> United Nations Development Programme

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Human development Index

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Food and Agriculture Organisation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> United Nations Environment Programme

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> United Nations Human Settlements Programme

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> United Nations Industrial Development Organisation



governmental institutions: MICOA<sup>11</sup> as a lead ministry counterpart to FAO, MINAG<sup>12</sup>, INGC<sup>13</sup>, INAM<sup>14</sup>, MTC<sup>15</sup>, MINER<sup>16</sup>) and some NGO<sup>17</sup> (e.g. IUCN<sup>18</sup>) which implement locally some activities. The programme through UN-HABITAT and FAO coordinates as well some activities with one of the very few local NGOs present in the district (UNAC<sup>19</sup>).

6. It is worth mentioning that this Joint Program was designed more or less simultaneously at a time when Mozambique was designated a pilot country for the initiative "Delivering as One<sup>20</sup>" which objectives are to provide technical assistance in a more coordinated way, capitalizing on the strengths and comparative advantages of the different members of the UN family and experimenting ways to increase the UN system's impact through more coherent programmes, reduced transaction costs for governments, and lower overhead costs for the UN system. The programme was very much designed taking into consideration the objectives of this initiative.

#### **1.2. Evaluation objective**

- 7. The objective of this mid-term review is to provide relevant decision makers with sufficient information to make an independent assessment of the performance of MDG-F 1681 to date in relation to:
  - The achievement of the overall programme outcomes: 1. Key stakeholders sensitized on environment & climate change, 2. Government capacity building to implement environmental policies, 3. Mainstreaming of climate proofing methodology in key stakeholders programming & activities, 4. Enhancement of community resilience to climate change, 5. Diversification of communities' livelihood options
  - Relevant MDG goals: 1. Poverty & hunger eradication, 2. Gender equality promotion & women empowerment, 3. Environmental sustainability, 4. Develop a global partnership for development.
- 8. The Terms of Reference are presented in <u>annex 1</u>.
- 9. In addition, it will identify key lessons learnt, identify best practices and make practical recommendations for follow up.
  - As per TORs, the consultant has been requested to pay particular attention to the following:
    - Design quality & coherence of the programme components, in relation with UNDAF, MDG and the degree of national ownership
    - Programme management model
      - Effectiveness of the programme and its contribution to the objectives of environment & climate change thematic window and MDG at local / national level.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> World Food Program

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ministério para a Coordinação da Acção Ambiental / Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Actions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Ministério de Agricultura / Ministry of Agriculture

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades / National Institute for Disaster Management

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia / Meteorology National Institute

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Ministério dos Transportes e Communicações / Ministry of Transport and Communication

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Ministério de Energia / Ministry of Energy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Non Governmental Organisation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> International Union for Conservation of Nature

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> União Nacional dos Camponeses / National Farmers Trade Union

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> More details on "Delivering As One" at <u>http://www.undg.org/?P=7</u>



#### **1.3.** Methodology used for the evaluation

- 10. The evaluation methodology was based on a 4 step approach: 1. Passive data acquisition (documentary review), 2. Active data acquisition (interviews & field trip), 3. Data analysis (turning data into relevant information), 4. Presentation of information & recommendations. Several types of data acquisition methods were combined: namely focus group, semi-structured interviews, individual interviews, followed by a detailed review of activities through the documentary analysis and field mission.
- 11. Specific questionnaires for each type of stakeholder (Government focal points [MICOA, INAM, INCG, MINAG, etc.], local authorities [Gaza DPA<sup>21</sup>, Chicualacuala SDAE<sup>22</sup>, District Administrator & technical teams, Mapai *Chefe de Posto*], final beneficiaries [local population and/or selected community leaders, village chiefs], each UN agency focal points, NGO heads, etc.) were designed based on a check-list of issues which details for each evaluation criterion and evaluation question what kind of information to obtain, from whom and how. The detailed methodological approach is presented in <u>annex 3</u>.

#### 1.4. Constraints and limitations on the study conducted

12. The mission timeframe was too short to produce any statistically significant findings. The emphasis was put therefore on reviewing as wide a range of issues as possible in the district. Actually, the original 10 days mission including 6 days in Chiculacuala was not long enough to provide the evaluator a comprehensive picture of the programme. In particular, it would not have been possible to discuss individually with many of the UN and government stakeholders. During the field trip, the mission was thus extended for another 4 days so the evaluator could have had the opportunity to discuss with at least some selected and considered important stakeholders at central level.

With little or no quantitative data, the evaluator based himself mainly on indirect information and crosschecking of these (*in situ* field checks, stakeholders interviews, and documentary review) to reach certain conclusions and recommendations.

- 13. Attempts were made to gather information from as many sources as possible. Accordingly, people from beneficiary groups, NGOs, all levels of Government both in Maputo, the Gaza province and the District were therefore interviewed. A list of meetings and persons met is provided in <u>annex 2</u>. The methods used included focus group discussions, semi structured interviews and detailed review of the activities implemented and documentary review.
- 14. As such, the mission believes that it has managed to put together a relatively well balanced and accurate picture of the situation at this stage of this stage of implementation (07/2010).
- 15. The field mission in the programme area was carried out in full collaboration with on-site programme staff who accompanied the evaluator during the village trips. Nonetheless, nearly all evaluation interviews with institutional and final beneficiaries were done without the presence of programme staff so as to keep the evaluation process independent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Direcção Provincial de Agricultura / Provincial Directorate for Agriculture

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Serviço Distrital de Actividades Económicas / District Department for Economic Activities



### 2. Description of interventions carried out

#### 2.1. Initial concept

16. The program is financed by Spain through the MDG-f, which was created to contribute to reaching the Millennium Development Goals. Based on calls for proposals, United Nations agencies can tap in funds from 8 programme areas including environment and climate change.

Five principles steer the access to this fund: 1. Programme ownership within national priorities, 2. Sustainability of activities, 3. Implementation (including monitoring and evaluation) focussing on results (and not activities), 4. Collaboration between the United Nations Agencies, leading to joint implementation and, 5. A reduction of transaction costs through minimum bureaucratic processes.

17. Accessing the fund is done through the elaboration of a concept note (call for proposals from selected UN country offices).

A concept note contemplating a programme on environmental mainstreaming and climate change adaptation, to be implemented in the Inkomati River and / or Limpopo river basins was designed and approved by the MDG-f Secretariat in 2007. It led to the formulation of a 7 million dollar full-scale programme proposal for the Rio Limpopo Basin in 2008.

Due to tight deadlines, the formulation process was swift (less than 3 months) and was initially carried out from Maputo with consultations at national level but little consultation on-site.

The implementation details took into consideration existing actions of some UN agencies (UN-Habitat, FAO, WFP) in the more highly populated areas of the Limpopo basin, with relatively good road access (e.g. Chibuto, Mabalane districts). Eventually, the choice of the programme area at the final presentation workshop in Xai Xai fell for a more remote district with little or no external support at the time: Chicualacuala. This was at the demand of the Government. This decision which was not accompanied by an adjustment process of the program (in terms of timeframe, logistics or budget) has subsequently lead to serious negative repercussions on the implementation of the programme until this day.

- 18. As the chosen district lacked basic information on almost all aspects related to environment and climate change risks, the program relied heavily (at least) on year 1 on the acquisition of data, resulting in a substantial number of initial studies and baselines while more on-site actions would be carried out in year 2 and 3. Although this was in line with programme implementation (which was agreed by all stakeholders), delays during Year 1 resulting in the lack of concrete actions by mid-year 2 has somehow disappointed the authorities at local and provincial level.
- 19. Due to the remoteness of the district, lack of proper working conditions and administrative requirements in Maputo, it was decided to pilot the programme from Chówkè (half way between the district and Maputo, and near the provincial capital Xai Xai) with a Programme Coordinator and his assistant. Technical UN agency staff was assigned or not to the district itself as per agreed programme work plan. Many activities (e.g. from component 2) are being implemented remotely from Maputo not requiring permanently specialised staff (e.g. UNEP during Year 1, UNDP, UNIDO) but only limited and very specific field visits.

The objective of the coordination is to facilitate the implementation of the programme (e.g. combine monitoring and evaluation, provide logistical support to UN agencies, collect



 $M\&E^{23}$  data in order to feed the PMC<sup>24</sup> with relevant information for proper decision taking, etc.).

The current coordinator is also the lead FAO technical assistant for the implementation of FAO's activities. This has led to a lot of confusion re. his responsibilities among UN agencies, governmental institutions but also final beneficiaries.

- 20. MICOA was designated as the lead ministry for the programme with FAO as a coordinating agency for the UN. Each UN agency was to collaborate closely with corresponding Governmental institutions in order to ensure program results ownership and empowerment. Until recently, this coordinating function within MICOA was non-existent with cooperation only just starting by mid-year 2 with the coordinator although MICOA has been extensively involved with UN agencies on technical issues and participated in several activities (e.g. from UNEP, UNDP).
- 21. In order to facilitate the implementation of the Joint Program, a Programme Management Committee PMC has been created: it includes members of each UN agency and its counterparts plus the local and provincial authorities. The PMC is fed with information by the Coordinator. It decides on all technical matters on a quarterly basis. It should be noted that most GOM counterparts are effectively participating in these meetings.
- 22. As per MDG-F implementation guidelines, a National Steering Committee has to be created, made up of the UN Resident Coordinator, the Spanish Cooperation Agency (AECID) and a representative of Government (Ministry of foreign Affairs or Ministry of Planning). It should cover strategic decision taking, mainly financial and programming which might change the course of the program.

This committee is not formally operational for this programme (no periodic meetings for this JP).

With the initiative "Delivering as One", there is no steering committee at national level for any particular joint programme: all joint programmes of the UN system are discussed collectively with Government. However, this system is not appropriate to discuss specific JP problems; the PMC therefore becomes *de facto* the main structure to discuss operational and strategic issues. Until now, the members from the (latent / inactive) national steering committee have not been called upon to take a decision on strategic issues of this JP (e.g. reallocation of UNEP funds).

- 23. On the technical side, a holistic approach to development was considered throughout the program formulation process: agencies were to collaborate in depth to implement the programme. It is worth mentioning at this stage as this is very unusual for multilateral development cooperation. However, we shall see that a holistic approach is very difficult to implement in a highly bureaucratic environment such as the UN in Mozambique.
- 24. Overall, the programme proposal was very much in line with the MDG-F requirements both in terms of operational implementation processes and in technical terms (programme thematic).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Monitoring and Evaluation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Programme Management Committee



#### **2.2. Detailed description of the evolution of the programme**

- 25. The program started in August 2008 for a period of 3 years. The proposed 7M\$ envelope did not consider the 7% support costs which were deducted from each agency (on a *pro-rata* basis).
- 26. Funds were made available on time for some agencies (e.g. FAO), late but with agency advance payments (e.g. UNDP, WFP) or late with delayed implementation (e.g. UN-HABITAT). This has not had any major repercussions on the implementation process as the 70% threshold disbursement rate was (barely) achieved for Year 1.
- 27. Reporting of Year 1 results as per initial MDG-F implementation guidelines was not considered satisfactory by the Secretariat which introduced new reporting formats in order to switch from activity monitoring to result oriented monitoring. This move showed that the implementation pace of the program was actually slower. Many activities of Year 1 due to be completed as per original work plan were not achieved by August 2009: funds were committed / disbursed but the activities were not entirely completed.

This new system was introduced just at the reporting period of the joint program (August 2009). This resulted in the coordination requesting new information for each UN agency and delays to compile the new information. For year 2, funds were made available in February instead of November, meaning that Year 2 activities started for some agencies 5-6 months later (September/October  $\rightarrow$  February). This delay has further slowed down the implementation of the program for some agencies (e.g. UN-HABITAT) in addition to the issues of remoteness and lack of working conditions in the programme area which require careful planning.

In addition, due to the design of the program (see chapter 3.1) delays in the implementation of some activities from agencies resulted in delays for other agencies, hence again slowing down the overall programme implementation.

- 28. Quarterly reporting through the PMC was initially carried out in Maputo. Following the advice of district and provincial authorities, the PMC meetings moved in 2009 from Maputo to Xai Xai in order to facilitate local district participation.
- 29. As mentioned before, the lack of basic climate change and environment related information in the district required the elaboration of various baselines studies in Year 1. Slow implementation resulted in various studies being finalized in the course of Year 2. As these were necessary in order to proceed further with on-site activities, this has resulted in little tangible results benefitting the population so far, while the expectations of the population are great (this JP was the first major development assistance to the district for many years). This situation was brought to the attention of the PMC by local / provincial authorities. It resulted in a UNEP proposal eventually accepted by April 2010, to use during year 2 funds left over from over-budgeted activities for on-site activities to strengthen or complement other agency activities (e.g. UNEP fish ponds and FAO's agricultural expansion and intensification, UNEP's subcontracted IUCN for cisterns to complement UN-HABITAT water tank activities).



## **3.** Levels of analysis: evaluation criteria and questions

#### **3.1. Programme design**

#### 3.1.1.Relevance

- 30. The program is very well anchored within national priorities: it was formulated taking specifically into account three recommended actions of the 2007 NAPA<sup>25</sup>: 1. Strengthening of an early warning system, 2. Strengthening capacities of agricultural producers to cope with climate change, 3. Management of water resources under climate change. These correspond approximately to 3 joint programme outcomes : "Key stakeholders sensitized on environment & climate change", "Government capacity building to implement environmental policies", "Enhancement of community resilience to climate change" which include water sector related activities.
- 31. Two additional programme outcomes were formulated: "Mainstreaming of climate proofing methodology in key stakeholders programming & activities" and "Diversification of communities' livelihood options"; the first one complements the NAPA initiative as all climate change related activities are relatively new in Mozambique and should be considered as pilot. The latter one refers directly to PARPA II<sup>26</sup>.

The program outcomes respond therefore to the national concerns in terms of both poverty reduction and response to climate change.

32. As climate change related development activities are relatively groundbreaking for both government and UN agencies, and have never been tested in Mozambique, the implementation of activities is actually following a process of tests and adjustments ('trials and errors'). Many activities are in fact 'firsts' being imported from other countries and/or organisations, and adapted to the very specific district conditions.

The pilot nature of the programme was never considered as an important factor for implementation during the formulation process and was therefore not taken into account. It is actually paramount as one should not expect all activities to be successful and further to this, the implementation of new activities needs time for adjustments to lead to the expected results.

In that respect, the programme follows still a very classical top-down approach to development as many activities are new to the region; this is a real risk for sustainability given the very short timeframe of the programme (3 years).

- 33. All program themes mentioned as climate change adaptation, climate proofing methodologies are relevant to the area, which was confirmed for many of those in the initial baseline studies and on-site by the evaluator; we can mention among others the following:
  - Environment charcoal production and bushfires for livestock / agricultural production: the region is being devastated around urban centres and along trunk roads
  - Water supply: the lack of drinking water is widespread in the district, including in all urban centres with renewable energy for pumping

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> National Adaptation Programme of Action: 1. Strengthening of an early warning system, 2. Strengthening capacities of agricultural producers to cope with climate change, 3. Management of water resources under climate change

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See PARPA II / May 2006 – Crosscutting issues: 3. Environment, 4. Food & Nutrition Security, 5. Science and Technology – pg 60-65



- Agricultural development which is slowed down because of lack of irrigation water with renewable energy for pumping, adapted genetic material (to semi-arid conditions) and increased productivity with animal traction.
- Livestock improvement through rehabilitation of spray cattle infrastructures (tick control).
- 34. In relation to the actual programme design, a holistic approach was adopted: results and activities sector wise depend from the specific expertise of UN agencies in order to achieve maximum efficiency: a common UN agency implementation is necessary to complete activities and achieve results. In addition, the location of programme sites was discussed in a participatory way between UN agencies and local authorities to maximise impact among beneficiaries. In that respect, the programme is up-to-date with the most recent development cooperation concepts. However, its actual application is far from easy because of the impeding internal (bureaucratic environment complex procurement procedures) and external factors (logistical issues like remoteness low density population-, lack of communication or basic facilities, weak local capacity).
- 35. Programme design issues include the overlapping of some activities between agencies such as FAO tree nurseries and UNDP tree nurseries (with very subtle differences for both activities actually), the latter not implementing the activity so far because of lack of expertise.
- 36. Conclusion: the choice of the Chicualacuala district as a programme area was not the best option to develop a pilot programme testing new concepts, adopting a holistic approach to development and being implemented by a large number of UN partners.

#### 3.1.2. Ownership of the design – national leadership in the development interventions

- 37. If some national authorities were consulted during the entire formulation process (from concept note to joint programme formulation like MICOA, MINAG), most did not participate actively in the programme formulation resulting in a poor definition of the role of each institution. Initially, this resulted in confusion over participation of national staff in the programme (issue of DSA<sup>27</sup> and transport fuel for institutions / local staff). This still has repercussions through the lack of (or little) common M&E between agencies and institutional (national) counterparts (see implementation 3.2.2). In addition, some agencies / institutions (e.g. INAM, Gaza DPA) were never consulted during the formulation process altogether. The programme formulation seems to have been an internal UN process. Several workshops were conducted though in Maputo and Xai Xai to validate the joint programme design. The Xai Xai workshop resulted in the final choice of programme area (Chicualacuala district); however, technically speaking, this was not an appropriate choice given the initial programme design (see paragraphs <u>34</u> and <u>36</u>, and last sentences of paragraph <u>17</u>).
- 38. MICOA as the designated lead coordinating ministry was also consulted during the elaboration of the program. However, it progressively gave up its lead in the formulation process as many programme activities were not actually directly referring to the NAPA although the joint programme did strongly inspire itself from. If indeed MICOA participated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Daily Subsistance Allowance



in the implementation of the program for specific activities (e.g. through  $PECODA^{28}$ ), it never took its lead role until now for coordination together with FAO (UN coordinating agency).

39. Notwithstanding, many activities are in line with Governmental institutions priorities including some, after programme adjustments by year one's end (e.g. INAM's weather stations & RANET<sup>29</sup>, construction of CERUM<sup>30</sup> by INGC, MINER and renewable energy, Gaza DPA and agricultural intensification / tree nurseries, etc.). Some governmental counterparts are less active (e.g. MINER, MINAG, MICOA) than others (e.g. INGC, INAM), which reflects the various degrees of commitment of institutions in the district. This is reflected or not in the specific development policies / strategies of these which

are why one of the criteria this district was chosen was the lack of development activities (be it NGOs, bi/multilateral agencies or Government).

#### **3.2. Process level**

#### 3.2.1.Efficiency

40. Overall, the implementation of the programme has been particularly slow and inefficient: there are some external negative factors affecting the implementation (namely the inadequacy of the programme area in relation to the original programme proposal) but also internal factors within the UN family like excessively complex and long procurement procedures combined with a holistic approach.

The initial design of the programme was so detailed that activities were to be implemented by multiple agencies; this might be a highly efficient method within a single organization with multiple departments sharing common procedures; it is very inefficient for separate institutions with different procedures or even just different corporate environments. Obviously, the programme design was an attempt to follow the initiative 'Delivering as One'.

41. Basically, many activities need the intervention of two or more agencies to be completed. This is not a real issue when the inputs are trainings or technical support which can be completed following the pace of the agency in charge.

It becomes a real challenge for materials and equipment or even subcontracted services (e.g. studies) which must endure complex procurement procedures. A typical example is the following: FAO's drip system must wait for the completion of UNIDO's solar panels which requires flow data information of the borehole to be dug by a UN-HABITAT subcontractor who needs the results of a regional borehole potential study completed as well by a UN-HABITAT subcontractor. In this implementation scheme, any small procurement delay will irremediably add up so that the last on the line is unable to deliver. In that particular case, the initial UN-HABITAT water studies were seriously delayed and the entire water component (programme result / outcome) is way behind schedule. This was recognized early by FAO which in a village (Madulo) skipped the entire process and proceeded by itself with the entire installation of equipments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Programa de Educação, Comunicação e Divulgação Ambiental / Programme of Environmental Education, Communication and Diffusion

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Radio and Internet Technology

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Centro de Recursos e de Usos Multiplos / Multiple Use and Resource Centre



42. The procurement procedures are considered complex or long because there is a real knowledge gap between the technical people in the agencies who need the material / services for their programme / project and the people who award the contracts. In particular, the procurement system is centralized by UNDP for 3 non-resident agencies (UNIDO, UNEP, UN-HABITAT) plus UNDP and completed on a standalone basis by WFP and FAO.

The gap runs between on the one hand people awarding the contracts who are not technical specialists but still must take a transparent decision and on the other hand people preparing the tenders who are not up-to-date with procurement procedures or find it difficult to 'follow the book' meticulously. This results in very long exchanges of internal memos between technical people and procurement committees or even cancellation of tenders and request for new procurement procedures for trivial details. Basically, tenders for procurement of equipment take on average 3 to 4 months (sometimes over 6 months and still waiting).

For a programme of such a small duration (3 years), these delays are excessive, affect negatively the implementation of the programme and should be taken into account for future programme implementation (e.g. year 3).

To no avail, agencies (e.g. UNIDO and UN-HABITAT) tried to combine the procurement of equipment in order to speed up the process; it was deemed too complex because funds originated from different budget lines within a programme and from 2 agencies; it was abandoned.

- 43. Conclusion: the procurement process is:
  - Complex : there are many different sets of rules even within a single agency
  - Transparent and relatively fraud proof: many agency individuals reflecting different levels of responsibility are participating in the procedures
  - Long in duration (procurement committee members are overwhelmed with the number of tenders to award inadequacy of human resource requirements)
  - Consuming excessive human resource and therefore costly (non-specialised procurement committee members need assistance on technical issues)

It is so problematic for this programme that many focal points indicated their preference for splitting tenders into smaller lots to avoid (international) complex procurement procedures through a long procurement committee decision making process.

The current programme set-up for acquiring materials and equipment while adopting a holistic approach does not add value, nor does it reduce transaction costs compared with an individual implementation approach by agencies.

- 44. At local level, there is a good collaboration between programme staff from different agencies (FAO, UN-HABITAT and WFP): savings are made through shared monitoring and evaluation; common programming or at least adjustment of work plans is made in order to avoid unnecessary waste of resources (fuel and time).
- 45. The working environment for resident agency staff (FAO, UN-HABITAT, WFP) in E. Mondlane is currently very unfavourable for an efficient programme delivery although it seems to have improved from even more difficult working conditions: lack of common 4WD transport, daily use of motorbike with a strong risk of injury, lack of electricity and proper communication facilities; these are probably a factor which deter as well focal points from frequent monitoring visits.
- 46. At activity level, efficient collaborations (as per original programme work plan) include for example:



- WFP's FFW<sup>31</sup> activities benefitting FAO livestock spraying corridors construction, embankments for gravity irrigation, communal *machamba*<sup>32</sup>'s fencing
- UNEP and FAO for fish farming water tanks (common funding)
- UNEP and UN-HABITAT for individual water harvesting cisterns through UNEP's subcontracting of IUCN (delayed activity though) : use of UN-HABITAT's local expertise / labour
- UN-HABITAT and UNDP in the production of an education video on CC consequences
- Joint FAO and UNEP collaboration with MICOA on environmental training to teachers
- 47. The remoteness of the programme area is a strong limiting factor for an efficient programme implementation strategy by all agencies: in particular, it is a deterrent for regular monitoring visits by focal points, either because it is easier to rely on subcontractors, government counterparts or local programme staff reports. Currently, only UNEP and (obviously) FAO's focal points are regularly supervising and / or monitoring their activities on-site (on a monthly basis). The other agencies do periodically visit the programme area but at a much slower pace posing the risk of being ill informed on the effective degree of implementation of their own activities, which might result as well in slower implementation.
- 48. In terms of logistics, FAO as a coordinating agency must provide logistical support for all agencies; while programme cars are freely available for other agencies, the procedure to access these is time consuming, requiring over 1 week planning for FAO to make transport available; in practice, only non-resident agencies with no other alternative use programme cars (in addition to FAO). Other agencies use their transport facilities at their own cost because it is far more efficient to do it internally and swiftly.
- 49. The Coordination unit is composed of 1 coordinator, 1 assistant and 2 drivers; the coordinator shares also the function of FAO's focal point, supervising a 2 people team in the district and giving support to other staff as appropriate. Combining these functions enables the Coordinator to have an in-depth knowledge of the programme (degree of implementation, issues, etc.). However, it is naturally very difficult to separate both functions and his work will inevitably bias towards his own implementing agency. The challenge is therefore to avoid negative consequences on other partner agencies and try as much as possible to remain neutral.
- 50. As mentioned in paragraphs 21 and 22, the PMC is a platform for discussion and consensus ; so far it has not formally taken decisions which affect the overall implementation of the programme; nor is there a National Steering Committee (currently latent); in this context, modifications of activities / sharing of funds are decided in a decentralised manner by each agency which propose amendments to the PMC for approval but retains as much as possible control over its budget. The PMC is therefore unable to decide more radical changes when

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Food For Work

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Family sector farmland



issues arise (e.g. the procurement issue is known by all agencies since programme start). This current system does not enable true cooperation between agencies, each one keeping control over its own funds.

The planning process by resident programme staff is currently accompanied locally by district authorities. However, there is no common planning; this has resulted on occasions in duplication of efforts (e.g. water pump distribution in Mapuvule by both FAO and SDAE benefitting the same villagers). Further to this, the intervention approaches of Government and the programme are radically different: mainly free distribution of input of equipment without village contribution. For the programme, free handouts are (in theory) conditional to specific criteria (e.g. improved productivity, food for work, etc.). Two different approaches undermine the results of the most restrictive one (the programme). As far as human resources are concerned, the high civil servant turnover at district level impedes the initiation of indepth relationships with programme staff for improved planning and common local implementation as these are not institutionalized but only *ad-hoc* based. Therefore, district staff is unevenly involved in the implementation of the programme.

- 51. The programme is characterized by a high flexibility in relation to the type of activities to be carried out. Starting in year 2, it progressively took into consideration local government requirements / requests (fish tanks, CERUM, weather stations), which are possibly a guarantee of government ownership and empowerment (details in paragraph <u>56</u>).
- 52. The programme is characterized by a good coordination level with the few NGOs present in the district: e.g. UNAC, FAO/UN-HABITAT and SDAE initially considering similar activities in common villages; several meetings resulted in amendments of activities (different beneficiaries [livestock promoter], changing location [water supply]).
- 53. The programme (except UNIDO) relies a lot on local sub-contracting for services and equipment while the expertise might not be readily available (e.g. water sector & geophysics, climate change proofing, etc). Indeed, a complex UN procurement environment favours local (low cost) provision of services or equipment which might be inadequate given the innovative nature of the programme. In that case, new external or foreign expertise might be more relevant but resulting in longer (international) procurement procedures.

This environment favours local procurement for all studies and services. It resulted in uneven quality of studies and sometimes inadequacy of some equipment /materials (there has been little subcontracted infrastructure so far). This has lead to some studies being incomplete or of relatively poor quality, slowing up the programme implementation rate (e.g. UN-HABITAT water sector studies which needed to be redrafted and/or complemented with additional information).

The situation is the opposite with technical backstopping: the UN partners rely a lot on each specialised agency staff while local human resources are readily available at Government level or even within the private sector with several advantages (knowing the terrain,



understanding the aspirations of the final beneficiaries, having the technical expertise to adapt new activities to the Mozambican environment, etc.).

#### 3.2.2. Appropriation of implementation by national stakeholders

- 54. The programme is characterized by a good ownership (actually improving over time) by local authorities and proactive national agencies (namely INGC, INAM, SDAE, some DPA staff who participated to studies); other governmental stakeholders are nonetheless very passive (e.g. MINER, MINAG), possibly because they are not directly involved in the programme implementation. Further to this, the final choice of all potential beneficiary communities was carried out by the district authorities taking into account the baseline study (selected criteria), water availability and potentially promising communal *machambas*.
- 55. The lack of common monitoring with the district and apparent lack of evidence of on-site achievements resulted in additional Government activity requests (see below) but also the creation of a (informal?) 'Control Commission' ("Commissão de Assessoria do Programa") to assess independently the implementation of the programme. Obviously, this is the result of poor communication at local level between the programme coordination and the district authorities (the coordination unit is located both in Chókwè and in Maputo). As there is no formal meeting point at district level, authorities are informed of completion of activities during PMCs only; there is little (institutionalized) articulation locally with some agencies not systematically informing the authorities of their progress; e.g. UNIDO, UNDP and to a lesser extend UN-HABITAT. This is due to the nature of their activities: subcontracting of constructions to private firms (UN-HABITAT, UNIDO), activities not implemented at field level (UNDP). With regards to UNDP's intangible results (leaflets, videos, guidelines, etc.), these are indeed received by all relevant stakeholders (e.g. authorities) but there seems to be little follow up on how to take advantage of all these products. A posteriori monitoring by the district authorities is carried out together with FAO, UN-HABITAT, UNEP and WFP which have on-site staff. Little is known by district authorities on UNIDO's activities. The creation of communication channels or an (institutionalized) framework for discussion (independent of PMC) between district authorities and the coordination would greatly improve the perception of the programme by district and provincial authorities.
- 56. The flexibility allowed by the MDG-F guidelines greatly facilitated the inclusion of governmental requests (e.g. fish tanks, bee keeping). These reflect Government priorities but not necessarily farmers' priorities. As with the programme, these are also of a pilot nature. Additional requests include improved (stone) housing, stone use for water tanks building, expertise in sandy dams ; the district rationale behind these proposals is to offer models to climate change adaptation for communities, which in the future could be reproduced by other donors, government and / or eventually transformed into commercial ventures. These are directly the results of an apparently very successful overseas visit to Kenya where district officials, civil servants and community leaders had the opportunity to see for themselves new



techniques and methods for development activities applied locally in semi-arid environments. Hence the importance of such study tours to win over influent district members.

- 57. From a Government point of view, this programme is difficult to implement: Governmental institutions must deal with different UN agencies for one single activity or result with different agreement formats (annual work plan or LOA<sup>33</sup>) and reporting requirements; e.g. INAM's weather station requires the intervention of UNDP for infrastructure building, FAO and UNEP for weather equipment procurement, UN-HABITAT for transport and DSA, and UNIDO for energy equipment procurement.
- 58. As per original proposal, the main objective of individual water tanks was of a demonstrative nature (to be coupled subsequently with CERUM to create a multiplication effect) ; by extension, it was decided to offer these to poor households ; however, the poorest households housings are unfit technically for the selected water harvesting through cisterns and roof gutters (need for iron and not thatched roofs), therefore making dubious the selection of poor households ; this was confirmed during the field trip with the exceedingly long wait (3 months) of UN-HABITAT to obtain from district authorities the list of initial beneficiaries. This resulted in delaying considerably the construction of individual cisterns (the objective of 100 cisterns [50 with UN-HABITAT's funds & 50 with UNEPs funds] by year 2's end has become unrealistic); one might also question the selection process ; how transparent is it as a vast majority of households (> 50%) must be actually considered as 'poor'.

Further to this, the July 2010 presidential visit in Mapai caused additional constraints on the already delayed programme implementation by requiring some activities (e.g. individual cisterns) to be completed at least in a demonstrative way in Mapai.

- 59. The programme enabled a wide participation of local stakeholders in the completion of (baseline, technical) studies, workshop, development of new concepts, e.g.:
  - Provincial DPA staff participated in the elaboration of community forest management plan to be implemented in 4 communities and little else
  - ETD<sup>34</sup> and EPAD<sup>35</sup> participated in the elaboration of the district PEDD with UNDP (CRISTAL<sup>36</sup> methodology)
  - ETD and EPAD supported the drafting of UNDP's PEDD guidelines
  - ETD staff participated in UNEP's workshop on training communities in environmental awareness raising activities (ex. controlled bush fires / deforestation reduction, water supply through roof collection, early warning system for disasters, livestock spray corridors, etc.), and divulged the results.
  - SDAE staff participated in all agriculture, livestock and forestry activities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Letter Of Agreement

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Equipe Técnico Distrital / District Technical Team

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Equipe Provincial de Planificação / Provincial Planning Team

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Community-based Risk Screening Tool – Adaptation and Livelihoods



60. National and provincial stakeholders are showing interest in lessons learned and several new concepts that are being tested in the district: e.g. UNDP's adapted CRISTAL methodology to integrate climate change adaptation as a planning tool for the Ministry of Planning, MICOA and climate proofing, INGC and CERUM.

There is great potential for government empowerment for several other programme results (like individual / community cisterns, improved slaughterhouses, small scale renewable energy for water supply) but the activities are still being implemented with little concrete results to show yet at this stage.

#### **3.3. Programme results**

#### 3.3.1.Effectiveness

- 61. Although the program is not on track for certain activities, it is making progress towards achieving its results; in particular, nearly all studies budgeted in year 1 have been finalized (exception : water sector) and the results divulged, although this is might be true only by early 2010 (6 months delay).
- 62. As mentioned before (paragraphs <u>40</u> to <u>43</u>), the programme lags behind schedule due to a combination of factors: ill-adapted programme design (e.g. pilot nature, little budget for logistics) to the remoteness of the district, adoption of a holistic approach to development (with breakdown of agencies responsibilities at activity level) combined with tedious procurement procedures.

This situation is worrying for the following outputs:

- 2.2 weather station and associated radio communication (UNDP)
- 4.3 CERUM construction (UN-HABITAT)

The above activities were though unplanned and unbudgeted activities which the JP accepted to include in the programme at the request of governmental stakeholders (INAM & INGC)

- 4.5 integrated system of water management (UN-HABITAT, UNIDO [FAO])
- 4.7 biogas production (UNIDO)
- 5.2 renewable energy for irrigation water (FAO, UNIDO)
- 5.3 slaughterhouse (FAO, UN-HABITAT)

Without an energetic programme acceleration to commit funds before September 2010, it is possible that the 70% threshold might not be reached for year 2. In any case, it might be wise beforehand to review and possibly downscale activities for the final year of the programme as the main sticking points for a smooth implementation (remoteness and long procurement procedures) are (obviously) likely to persist by the end of year 3.

63. Although this was not envisioned at the formulation phase, the programme contains major pilot components which objectives are to test methodologies, new concepts and methods (environmental mainstreaming, climate proofing, renewable energy, etc.) for streamlining climate change adaptation at all levels (from Government to village members); as such, the programme is innovative; equally, it has entire classical development components (water sector, agricultural development, environmental capacity building). It is the combination of the 2 which makes it unique for Mozambique and to this respect should be considered as a blueprint for future climate change adaptation interventions.



- 64. At this stage it is too early to identify positively success stories due to the delays in implementation; this might be done by the end of the programme (year 3) requiring specific actions for divulgation: however, potential success stories candidates as per concrete actions observed by the evaluator so far are the following:
  - Combination of renewable energy and drinking water (UNDP / FAO / UN-HABITAT, UNIDO) *PILOT* activity
  - Construction of a modern slaughterhouse in a livestock trade centre (Mapai) (UNIDO, FAO, UN-HABITAT, WFP)
  - Individual and communal rainwater harvesting systems (cisterns) (UNEP, UN-HABITAT) *PILOT* activity
  - Reactivation of livestock promoters network combined with proximity (E. Mondlane) livestock pharmacy (FAO)
  - Combination of agricultural development and environmental capacity building as a way to reduce natural resources pressure by villagers (UNEP, UNDP, FAO) *PILOT* activity
  - Combination of fish farming and small livestock (UNEP, FAO) PILOT activity
  - Agricultural diversification (and subsequent improved food security and quality) through adoption of new crops (legumes) and expansion (FAO)
  - Conservation agriculture as a way for climate proofing (FAO) to reduce negative consequence like increased charcoal production, selling of livestock or feeding on wild berries and fruits during natural disasters
- 65. All activities related to environmental and CC<sup>37</sup> adaptation mainstreaming, environmental risk (UNEP, UNDP, WFP [FAO]) contributed to highlighting environmental issues on <u>local</u> policy agendas; so far, there are (bilateral?) discussions at programme level (focal points) how to best integrate these topics at regional or national levels; this should be discussed at PMC meetings, on the agenda of the coordinator and a major task of the lead coordinating ministry (MICOA). In addition, UNDP has produced a "Policy Note" at national level to facilitate GOM and donors' policy dialogue to integrated CC issues into PARPA II. This note was discussed with MICOA and shared in a package of policy notes that the donor community contributed to the Government led process of elaboration of the national development plan.
- 66. With regards to gender, no particular actions have so far been carried out in integrating environmental preoccupations in a differentiated way between sexes; on-site separate discussions by the evaluator with female and male beneficiaries showed that women initially resist strongly any change but once it is adopted, they are becoming vibrant multiplier agents / mentors (e.g. no till, mulching techniques FAO). The programme initiated exchange visits between villages (mainly male oriented?) as a way to convince newly approached communities of the feasibility of new techniques or methods; these are particularly successful albeit carried out mainly outside of the district (for lack of results yet within the district). The program does have few gender specific activities (fish farming, small livestock production) but the adopted approach focuses more on equal gender participation in programme related activities. Gender specific activities in this part of Mozambique to put a message across are not *a priori* of fundamental importance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Climate Change



67. By carefully interviewing different sets of final beneficiaries of the programme (villagers) who have been exposed to various extends to the packages of programme activities (agricultural development through expansion / intensification, installation of renewable energies for water supply, environmental & climate change workshops, adoption or not of land use plans, quotas in relation to the utilisation of natural resources [charcoal], etc.) and comparing their responses, one could see a spectacular modification of attitude of villagers between those who were on board the programme since early year 1 and those recently contacted. In particular, villagers view their environment and village surroundings very differently. This might not necessarily mean (yet) any change of practices but we can reckon that the entire set of programme activities can be a first step to give a sense of responsibility to communities on sustainable use and exploitation of natural resources.

While it might be already relevant to document these results, it will be crucial to divulge these by the end of the programme, possibly during a 6 month programme extension if accepted.

68. Some early programme results related to agricultural development were so successful that in the particular case of FAO, excess production was wasted because of lack of commercial outlets; no such success was probably anticipated during the initial programme formulation as there was no mention of any value chain approach; merely increased food security was considered, not the development of commercial outlets. In any case, this dampened somehow initial villagers enthusiasm and resulted together with district authorities to finding innovative solutions (e.g. fish farming + small livestock + excess agricultural production).

Interviews showed also that other early programme results like tree nurseries showed (and are still showing as per evaluator's interviews) next to no interest from beneficiaries, barely the obligation as per presidential decree to plant seedlings (villages required to reserve an area for reforestation). The programme rationale behind tree seedlings production was initially for reforestation purpose, given the high rate of deforestation in some parts of the district for charcoal production. Despite awareness raising activities, the initiative attracted very little interest from farmers given the particularly long investment recovery rate: e.g. over 50 years for chamfuta trees (Afzelia quanzensis) which is routinely (and unsustainably) used for high grade charcoal production. Instead, farmers showed interest for fruit trees, namely citrus, lemon, mafurreira (Trichilia emetica), banana, papaya (Carica papaya), pineapple, canhueiro (Sclerocarya birrea), cajueiro (Anacardium occidentale), mango trees; this was combined with household agro-processing trainings. The trees located near farmers' houses primarily improve the food security but have little effect on deforestation; the latter must be tackled through other programme strategies like agricultural intensification (with irrigation water [FAO – UNIDO – UN-HABITAT]) and/or expansion of existing agricultural areas (FAO – WFP). In any case, one might question the adopted approach which lacks any activity to reduce charcoal demand (e.g. no activity on improved stoves in Maputo, Xai Xai).

69. The programme still has little concrete on-site results at this stage to invest resources in wide scale divulgation activities (communication strategy). However, it might be relatively easy through the lead coordination ministry (MICOA) to set up a communication strategy to divulge progressively at governmental level through regular national / provincial workshops the successful methodologies and associated results of the programme. However, this function at MICOA is dormant.

The issue of programme visibility is directly related to the coordinating agency. The Coordinator combines 2 different functions: FAO focal point and MDG programme Coordinator. The latter relies on data from the former (and all other agency focal points) in order to feed the PMC with information. On-site visits of nearly all stakeholders refer to the



programme as to FAO's. Furthermore, some villagers mentioned FAO and its brigades ("brigadas da FAO") while referring to the other agencies. It was also the case for some national focal points during individual interviews. At the time of the evaluation, notice boards were being shipped from Maputo to E. Mondlane, which should improve the programme visibility. Additionally, the location in Maputo of the coordination unit at FAO's premises is inappropriate, albeit being convenient in terms of working conditions. MICOA's offer of premises (to be rehabilitated though) is therefore welcome ; however the role of the lead ministry should not stop here – see paragraph <u>76</u> on the potential role of MICOA's for the 3<sup>rd</sup> and final year of the programme.

At this stage of programme implementation, a vast majority of stakeholders refer to the programme as of FAO's.

- 70. MDG-f requires the setting-up of an advocacy strategy per programme to divulge its objectives and goals (increasing public and institutional awareness of MDGs, improving transparency & accountability). Some activities covering these aspects are embedded within the programme work plan under outputs:
  - 1.1 Environmental priorities and indicators reflected in planning frameworks and budgets at district and community level: this is well under way (e.g. PEDD – UNDP, SETSAN & CC during year 1).
  - 2.3 stakeholders trained to incorporate and report on environmental and climate change risks events: completed by year 1 (UNEP, FAO, UNDP).
  - Numerous trainings of civil society members, civil servants and final beneficiaries are being conducted on climate proofing, environmental mainstreaming, CC adaptation, principally by UNDP, FAO and UNEP.
- 71. The above activities are actually specific to the programme; however agencies on an ad-hoc basis try to promote or attract interest of government institutions / ministries so as to facilitate appropriation of the results for replication elsewhere in Mozambique (e.g. WFP's district profiles and risk mapping, UNDP's PEDD guidelines).

These actions do not constitute a national advocacy program which goal is to divulge MDG-f objectives to speed up their achievement. To date, no such plan is being implemented by the UN agencies in Mozambique.

- 72. The programme indicators refer directly to the outputs (results). Output indicators are relatively easy to monitor; however, the PRODOC<sup>38</sup> lacks indirect impact indicators which should assess qualitatively or quantitatively the usefulness of the results from a beneficiaries' viewpoint. This would pave the way for assessing the impact of the programme.
- 73. A detailed local and national contribution of the programme to the MDGs is located in  $\frac{annex}{6}$ .
- 74. There is a good multiplication effect of environment awareness raising workshops and seminars benefitting school teachers, members of district *Conselhos Consultivos*<sup>39</sup>, community leaders and to a lesser extend members of student lead environmental clubs ("*Clubes Ambientais*").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Programme Document

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Consultancy Council



#### 3.4. Sustainability

- 75. The programme is testing a whole new range of development concepts and combination of development activities related to a new sector: climate change adaptation; as such it is bound that some will succeed and others fail. It is therefore important to document all program results and in particular, outputs that could or are likely to become sustainable.
- 76. One series of programme results (e.g. more sustainable natural resource utilization, conservation agriculture) bet on a change of attitude from village beneficiaries. While results so far are very encouraging (see paragraph 67), their sustainability is more likely to depend of long term follow-up instead of high intensity support until the closure of the programme (3 years duration only). Hence the importance of creating such mechanisms by the end of the programme if one wants to avoid a collapse at programme closure which is typical of development activities in remote areas (e.g. in Chicualacuala district : community livestock promoters becoming dormant after VetAid's project closure; deactivated community's *machambas* in Chissapa after CARITAS' departure). In that context, it is of paramount importance to empower:
  - Community leaders and communal management committees on information on commercialisation outlets, technical management of programme assets, proper management of (in)formal farmers' association, communication channels on where to obtain additional support and/or information, etc.
  - District authorities (through SDAE or <u>any</u> other institution) to follow-up beneficiary association or make sure that they budget a (very?) low intensity follow-up mechanism (yearly or twice-yearly programme area visits to provide advice to beneficiaries).

If in the end, on-site programme results sustainability is difficult to achieve due to weak government capacity, absence of stakeholders for taking over, combined with the district remoteness and lack of donor support, one might consider programme sustainability from a different viewpoint: namely Government / donor / civil society empowerment at regional or national level of new methods and development concepts successfully tested to tackle climate change during this programme; in that respect, MICOA might play a prominent role if any. An approximation between the programme coordination unit and the lead ministry could be therefore considered; however, this would test the lobbying capacity of MICOA to attract or interest regional and national institutions in mainstreaming CC through programme results. Ideally, both approaches to sustainability should be strived forward and the achievement of one should not come at the cost of the other.

77. At district level, while programme ownership is relatively high with district staff (SDAE agriculture & livestock personnel, Administrator, *Chefe de Posto*, EPAD staff, etc.) participation in numerous on-site programme activities, one might question the capacity of programme follow-up by local authorities given the very low level of available district funds to develop further pilot programme activities; taking into consideration that a 3 year duration of a pilot program might not be enough to refine CC methodologies and empower locally beneficiaries (in particular for a new thematic).

Additionally, taking over by other stakeholders (e.g. civil society) is unlikely as these are nearly non-existent in the district (see paragraph  $\frac{76}{10}$  on project's deactivation after NGOs departure – which might happen as well for this programme).

78. At provincial level, there is no Government climate change focal point; therefore, it is difficult to introduce these new thematic. Nonetheless, UNDP has done intensive work in



training and empowering provincial technical officials in the area of CC (CRISTAL training in Xai Xai, 6 months joint work with EPAP on how to address CC issues in planning and at least 3 joint visits to the district with MICOA's focal point in the EPAP.

- 79. At national level, 2 institutions are highly likely to follow-up activities by programme's end: INAM (meteorological station & RANET) and INGC (CERUM & risk mapping); the activities are actually part of their development strategy. Therefore, they are eager to empower themselves with the programme results. In those particular cases, it is the programme flexibility which enabled those activities to be taken on-board. It is therefore probable that the most sustainable programme results are those which are directly requested by institutional / final beneficiaries; to that extent, this should be a high priority when planning the last and final year of the programme especially since the district has now integrated CC adaptation in its recent development strategy (with UNDP's support CRISTAL methodology).
- 80. With on-site results, the programme took the option of maximizing long-term sustainability and adoption rate by beneficiaries: therefore, the choice of simple techniques, local materials was preferential. While the lifespan for these infrastructures is questionable, it has the immense advantage of low cost (easy rebuilding and duplication) especially in a remote area such as the Chicualacuala district.

The quality of soft results (studies, plans, guidelines) is uneven depending on the quality of the subcontracted human resources but in general, all studies related to inventories, integration of environmental mainstreaming, risk mapping and environmental / natural resources assessments should be considered as of good quality as these are being either adapted by local stakeholders (SDAE, district authorities) or attract the interest of national stakeholders (Ministries and state institutions) which want to reproduce the results in other parts of the country. The latter one is the most promising result of the programme, given its pilot nature. Again, instances (local environmental awareness raising workshops – UNEP/UNDP, water sector studies – UN-HABITAT) showed that subcontracting locally for specialized expertise to avoid complex tender procedures can sometimes result in low quality results.

#### **3.5.** Country level assessment

- 81. With regards to on-site results, the programme might potentially have a major impact (details in <u>annex 6</u>) in:
  - MDG 1 eradication of extreme poverty through all activities related to sustainable agriculture which is being intensified and expanded and introduction of agro-forestrry practices, in particular fruit trees promotion although increased (human, technical, financial) efforts should be devoted to strengthening results sustainability, especially those benefitting the population. Increased productivity resulting in more economic development locally is probably going to result from the slaughterhouse construction. If livestock market facilities were to be constructed in the future around that slaughterhouse, Mapai would definitely have the potential to become a major livestock centre for the province.



- MDG7: environmental sustainability is being tackled in various ways through mainstreaming (integration of CC into strategies and policy making at district level) but also concrete actions like land use plans focusing on sustainable utilization of natural resources (e.g. charcoal quotas) and the outputs on disaster mitigation measures, preparedness and early warning which ownership is quasi secured institutionally (INAM and INGC). The water supply related activities are potentially the most important component of the programme; however, their implementation is being very much delayed, casting doubt on impact by programme's end.
- MDG 8 Gobal partnerships through the introduction of energy efficient techniques (solar panels) and stakeholders' capacity building in tackling CC adaptation. As UNIDO's activities are depending from other agencies' inputs, their implementation is slow and might require downscaling however.
- 82. As mentioned in paragraph <u>6</u>, this joint programme was conceptualized taking into account the initiative "Delivering as One". Jointness was therefore considered paramount for increasing aid delivery effectiveness (as per Paris declaration and Accra Agenda for Action<sup>40</sup>). Still, operationally speaking, the PRODOC does not include any jointness indicator, hence the impossibility to measure it.

A common implementation was considered the most effective solution. After nearly 2 years of implementation, it is obvious that this concept is not functional within the UN family in Mozambique: a common implementation mechanism as it was conceived for this joint programme (see details on holistic approach and procurement issues in paragraphs 34, 40 to 43) slows aid delivery.

Instead, individual implementation but common programming, planning, monitoring & evaluation might be a more balanced or realistic approach to increasing development aid effectiveness within the UN family. In any case, a holistic approach to development should not either be discarded but not considered per result or activity (as in this joint programme): one agency only per output taking into account each agency's specific expertise. Future joint programme should definitely <u>not</u> consider jointness at activity level.

- 83. Whether the joint programme will influence the country's public policy framework is basically depending on the (future programme) visibility strategy (to be developed during the final year) and the appropriation / mainstreaming of new tools and methods by institutional stakeholders to tackle more effectively climate change and environmental degradation. Both issues should become priority n°1 for the Coordinating Agency (FAO) and obviously the lead ministry (MICOA) as a facilitator.
- 84. In relation to best practices and lessons learned to be transferred elsewhere, ironically, the pilot nature of the programme implied the import of new concepts from elsewhere (e.g. rain water harvesting techniques from Kenya or fish farming from Chókwè, CRISTAL methodology from IUCN<sup>41</sup>). Nonetheless, soft products (UNDP's PEDD guidelines, WFP's district profile and risk mapping, CERUM installations combined with water harvesting and renewable energy) could indeed be seriously considered as blueprints for similar intervention elsewhere in Mozambique. This is why UN agencies are promoting these concepts / activities to Government for appropriation. Due to the slow implementation of the programme, it is still

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Complete details of the declaration and agenda on : <u>http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Details on <u>www.cristaltool.org</u>



too early to consider on-site results & methods as best practices to be divulged. Potential candidate activities are mentioned in paragraph  $\underline{64}$  though.

85. In terms of visibility one might question the coordinating agency's choice to select one person only both as a focal point and the joint programme Coordinator. This combination has nonetheless the advantage of in-depth knowledge of programme issues compared with other MDG-f Coordinators that are being contracted for this function only. However, it might be less appropriate to locate a programme coordinator within its agency instead of the lead coordinator's ministry (as is done in other MDG-f programmes elsewhere). This is a strong signal towards the lead ministry that its contribution is not really needed.



## 4. Lessons learned and conclusion

86. The PRODOC was not adapted to the specific conditions of the Chicualacuala district (remoteness, lack of basic conditions, inexistence of other donors, weak capacity, etc.) given its pilot nature. This was due to a last minute change in the final choice of programme area. While the area in itself is a good candidate for a programme on CC adaptation given the recurrence of disasters (mainly droughts and floods), the programme formulation process should have resulted in a much more simple and straightforward PRODOC.
A programme to be implemented in such barsh environment (no easily available fuel or programme).

A programme to be implemented in such harsh environment (no easily available fuel or power on-site for logistical purposes, little water, poor road access, remoteness from large urban centres, low density population & dispersed beneficiaries) should not focus on testing new initiatives but implement well-tried methods and techniques.

- 87. Although the MDG-f might have its own internal deadlines, it is important that a programme proposal is allowed to be fully conceptualised and result in a wide consensus by all potential stakeholders; a swift formulation leads up to a poor institutional setup (e.g. weak lead ministry) and major programme amendments during the implementation (e.g. which are of marginal consequence for the implementation thanks to a very flexible setup as per operational joint programme guidelines.
- 88. In a highly bureaucratic environment, a holistic approach to development is not one of the best options; integrated agency implementation at activity level results in poor delivery; therefore, future joint programmes must consider individual delivery capacity as per agency 'core businesses' and only common M&E and planning. For outputs requiring several agency expertises (e.g. UNIDO solar panels, UN-HABITAT boreholes, FAO drip irrigation equipment), it is necessary to entrust the entire procurement process to one single agency even if this results in more inter-agency collaboration for specifications and tender documents preparation.
- 89. The procurement delays are the result of a widening misunderstanding gap between people preparing tender documents and awarding selection committee members: from the perspective of people preparing the tenders, the procurement requirements and procedures are cumbersome, complicated and time consuming (therefore inefficient); from the award committee members' perspective, these procedures are necessary as nearly fraud-proof but the sheer number of tenders in relation to the available human resources result in overload and delays; furthermore, agency staff preparing tenders are not committed to preparing properly tender documents which in that case must be systematically rejected (to ensure transparency). This issue should be addressed within the UN family (at RCO<sup>42</sup> level?) as it is apparently recurrent for nearly all joint programmes.
- 90. The current combination of awareness raising activities with livelihoods and economic alternatives is a powerful approach for environment related & CC adaptation attitude changes of beneficiaries (both institutional and at village level) although it is too early to confirm any change of practices; only ex-post evaluation might have the opportunity to analyse this issue.
- 91. The pilot nature of the programme was not initially recognised during the conceptualisation stage while specific arrangements might have come in handy (involve expertise for research, financial margin for tests and trials, etc.). Actually, all activities which are being tested are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Resident Coordinator Office (of the United Nations)



conducted not as tests; there is therefore no breathing space (time, funds, extra human resources, materials or equipment) for adjustments. This is a serious risk that should be considered for the 3<sup>rd</sup> year (requiring again possibly downscaling of activities and transferring resources to consolidate or adjust existing results).

#### 92. Conclusions:

- The programme is slowly slipping behind schedule due to a combination of factors of which the most critical might be procurement delays for materials and services. At the time of this mid-term evaluation, there was no sign that this situation might change for the best in the foreseeable future; therefore, allowing downscaling of activities or reformulation of activities might be necessary to accommodate for a slower implementation pace. While this will not necessarily affect the outcome of the programme, it might substantially reduce its impact, therefore reinforcing the pilot nature of this particular programme as opposed to tackling on a large scale climate change and environmental degradation in the Chicualacuala district.
- This programme should be considered technically as a milestone in Mozambique for actions related to climate change and environmental mainstreaming; therefore, it will be very important to document all (un-) successful outputs, implementation & management arrangements, and new methods and methodologies which could be adopted for future interventions by both the Government and development aid agencies.
- This program has shown the limits of jointness: while the initiative 'Delivering as One' is the way forward to increase aid effectiveness, the processes that could be improved / simplified / combined should be carefully chosen; in particular common agency implementation is still a long way off as there are major hurdles to overcome in Mozambique starting with the procurement as it is so striking in this programme. In the meantime, individual implementation but common planning and M&E, is still probably the most efficient way of joint UN programme implementation.



## 5. Recommendations

### 5.1. Planning Year 3

- 93. Complete delayed activities of year 2 (e.g. committed individual cisterns & initial boreholes plan / UN-HABITAT & UNEP, solar panels / UNIDO).
- 94. To speed up the implementation of the programme in year 3, a reallocation of activities with corresponding budgets transfers between agencies is necessary, so as to streamline as much as possible the implementation (1 result per agency whenever possible) and avoid the similar delays of years 1 and 2. The relevance of year 3 programme activities (e.g. based on PEDD) should be assessed against district priorities (e.g. through a local workshop preferably or bilateral [UN agency] discussions prior to the next PMC). The programme outcomes should remain as such but activities might be amended as per agreed priorities and original PRODOC.

A thorough review of the PRODOC should also result in swapping certain activities between agencies if some lack the technical expertise (e.g. UNDP agro-forestry activities transferred to FAO).

95. Year 3 activities requiring long procurement procedures should be definitely discarded, particularly when agency's results depend from tendered equipment of another agency.

### 5.2. Acceleration of implementation:

- 96. On-site working conditions for agency staff must be substantially improved minimum: 12h power through grid access and generator backup. Although mentioned often by a vast majority of stakeholders, no programme 4WD pickup should be permanently stationed due to the lack of fuel and additional logistical problems that it will create.
- 97. Climate change mainstreaming activities should be accelerated, in particular: climate proofing / UNEP (possibly in collaboration with UNDP?), district land use and water resources plan / UN-HABITAT.

#### 5.3. Increase stakeholders' empowerment:

- 98. As indicated in paragraph <u>94</u>, local government priorities should be clearly reflected in year 3 activities (if they do contribute to the programme outcomes).
- 99. An approximation of resident agency staff and district civil servants (e.g. SDAE, ETD team) must be initiated by moving towards district premises ; this would greatly facilitate common planning and monitoring: the resident agency staff should be embedded locally and have officially a district counterpart assigned.



- 100. So far, the programme management has not much called upon local expertise for the more conventional components of the programme (e.g. agricultural development / FAO). Government backstopping could become though a useful mechanism for assistance in programme implementation; IIAM, INCAJU staff, water engineers should be involved more closely for agricultural intensification and expansion, fruit tree nurseries, water supply development. A forum (location still to be determined?) to discuss technical issues related to implementation on a monthly or 3-month basis should be set-up.
- 101. An approximation of the Coordination Unit and lead coordination ministry (MICOA) should be initiated asap<sup>43</sup>. The Coordination Unit must move to MICOA's recently designated premises (pending proper rehabilitation). A new role for MICOA should be defined; possibly as a facilitator promoting and/or divulging among Government agencies the programme results; this combination would strengthen the institutional framework for programme coordination.

### 5.4. Improving coordination

- 102. Although it is probably too late to rethink at a new management arrangement for the coordination unit, one should consider streamlining it so that FAO's focal point and the Coordinator's functions are more disconnected. It is necessary for the Coordinator to progressively delegate certain tasks in Maputo (e.g. data collection and analysis from each agency) to an assistant and collaborate more with MICOA (if any interest in doing so by MICOA).
- 103. Joint monitoring (e.g. 3 days duration) of agency and government focal points must be organised on a two or three monthly basis (pending improvement of working conditions at local level [water, electricity, etc.]; the PMC should budget for it (the source should come from deleted activities, budget left-over or contributions of UN partners or the coordination to be discussed at the PMC); in particular, this would reduce the authorities' mistrust which culminated by the creation of a parallel monitoring commission. It would enable focal points to see for themselves the implementation of the programme and the issues that it faces; joint monitoring should be funded by the Coordination Unit budget or alternatively its funding source decided during a PMC. Technical meetings are to be initiated on an ad-hoc basis between agencies.
- 104. The Coordination Unit is moving asap to MICOA's premises (see as well paragraph <u>101</u>).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> As soon as possible



#### 5.5. Increase impact and sustainability

- 105. Due to the pilot nature of the programme, additional support must be sought off to go from pilot CC adaptation activities as in this programme to large scale implantation; lobbying activities by the Coordination unit and /or RCO should be immediately engaged based on the current results of the programme like environmental & CC adaptation mainstreaming at local level.
- 106. A 6 month programme extension must be seriously considered to allow for extended supervision of the results of tests and trials (e.g. fish farming, supervision of land use plans, strengthening of informal farmer's organizations, etc.).
- 107. The expansion of agricultural schemes (in area) must be considered as priority as a substitution to natural resources (mainly charcoal) exploration. In parallel, informal associations must be strengthened with minimum technical / financial management awareness sessions.
- 108. The adoption of techniques and methods is greatly facilitated when villagers see for themselves the results of new techniques or methods; model villages should be selected and a plan devised for regular visits by other communities benefiting from the programme. Therefore, the construction of the CERUM and transfer of demonstration activities should be accelerated. CERUM might be a key element of sustainability of many programme components.
- 109. Tree nurseries must not focus exclusively on slow growing timber species but associate fruit trees, livestock feeds & leguminous trees/shrubs for soil improvement & erosion control like *Sebania* or *Leucaena*, thus improving food security and generating income if associated with agro-processing (fruit conservation, livestock fodder, etc.).
- 110. The demonstration effect of individual cistern must be increased but the concept of free individual rain water harvesting tanks should be abandoned and priority should be given towards communal cisterns.
- 111. Programme livestock promoters should be networked and referred to the E. Mondlane pharmacy.

#### 5.6. Increase visibility

112. A common agency divulgation strategy re. soft products (studies, concepts, methodologies) must be devised immediately to improve programme visibility and potentially increase its impact through empowerment of programme results. The lead ministry (MICOA) should be the key for the implementation of this strategy.



### 5.7. RCO

- 113. The RCO needs to review at the highest level (Minister) the involvement of MICOA as the lead coordinating ministry: its role and responsibilities should be clearly redefined for the final year of the programme; e.g. as a facilitator for divulging programme results among Governmental institutions and/or empowering these with new CC adaptation concepts.
- 114. The RCO should initially and internally open a forum of discussion on the UN procurement system in Mozambique, reviewing the constraints to swift programme implementation; it should eventually lead to a reform of the procurement system; on a short term basis, systematic and periodic (e.g. annual) trainings of UN staff dealing with tender preparations should be initiated asap.



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Annex 1: Terms Of Reference



#### MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE MDG-F JOINT PROGRAMME ON ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN MOZAMBIQUE

#### **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

# 1. GENERAL CONTEXT: THE MDG-F ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE THEMATIC WINDOW

In December 2006, the UNDP and the Government of Spain signed a major partnership agreement for the amount of  $\in$ 528 million with the aim of contributing to progress on the MDGs and other development goals through the United Nations System. In addition, on 24 September 2008 Spain pledged  $\notin$ 90 million towards the launch of a thematic window on Childhood and Nutrition. The MDGF supports countries in their progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and other development goals by funding innovative programmes that have an impact on the population and potential for duplication.

The MDGF operates through the UN teams in each country, promoting increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions through collaboration among UN agencies. The Fund uses a joint programme mode of intervention and has currently approved 128 joint programmes in 50 countries. These reflect eight thematic windows that contribute in various ways towards progress on the MDGs.

The Environment and Climate Change thematic window aims to contribute to a reduction in poverty and vulnerability in eligible countries by supporting interventions that improve environmental management and service provision at the national and local levels, as well as increasing access to new funding mechanisms and expanding the ability to adapt to climate change.

The Window includes 17 joint programmes that encompass a wide range of subjects and results. Nevertheless, certain similar underlying characteristics can be identified across most of these joint programmes. The majority of the programmes in the window seek to contribute to three types of result: making the environment, natural resource management and action against climate change a mainstream focus in all public policy; improving national capacities to plan and implement concrete actions in favour of the environment; and assessing and improving national capacities to adapt to climate change.

The joint programmes within this thematic window serve a variety of participants<sup>44</sup>, ranging from national governments to local populations. All joint programmes include a support component directed at national and local governments. Other beneficiaries include civil society, communities and citizens.

# 2. THE MDG-F ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME IN MOZAMBIQUE

#### a. Programme Components, Outcomes and Outputs

The Programme is called "Environmental Mainstreaming and Adaptation to Climate Change". It started in September 2008 and is of three years duration. The Joint Programme (JP) has two main components and five expected outcomes as follows:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> It refers to what previously was refereed as beneficiaries



#### Component 1 - Environment and climate change mainstreaming

Expected outcomes:

- 1. Government, civil society, communities and other stakeholders informed, sensitised and empowered regarding environment and climate change issues;
- 2. Government capacity at central and decentralised levels to implement existing environment policies strengthened;
- 3. Climate proofing methodology mainstreamed into government development plans, UN/Donors programming and local stakeholders' activities and investments;

#### Component 2 - Adaptation to climate change

Expected outcomes:

- 4. Community coping mechanisms to climate change enhanced;
- 5. Community livelihoods options diversified.

Outputs are as follows, listed by outcome:

Outcome 1. Government, civil society, communities and other stakeholders informed, sensitized and empowered on environment and climate change issues:

Outputs

1.1 Environmental priorities and indicators reflected in planning frameworks and budgets at district and community level

1.2 GIS-based data and maps on climate change vulnerability for risk areas

1.3 Training programmes on disaster and climate change prediction, including interpretation of maps and application of monitoring data for early warning purposes

1.4 Knowledge and experience sharing within the different groups (UN implementing agencies and beneficiaries)

Outcome 2. Government capacity at central and decentralized levels to implement existing environment policies strengthened

Outputs

2.1 National Disaster Preparedness plan and other relevant plans revised/updated to include climate change and environment aspects

2.2 Early warning and communication system enhanced in the Gaza province

2.3 Authorities, civil society and other relevant actors trained to incorporate and report on environmental and climate change risk events

Outcome 3. Climate proofing methodology mainstreamed into government development plans, UN / donors' programming and local stakeholders' activities and investments:



Outputs

- 3.1 Tools for climate proofing of risk zones in the Limpopo River Basin developed
- 3.2 Assessment of climate proofing approaches carried out
- 3.3 Stakeholders trained on climate proofing

Outcome 4. Community coping mechanisms to climate change enhanced:

#### Outputs

4.1 Inventory of strategies and coping mechanisms currently in use by communities and in the Limpopo River Basin

- 4.2 Community based natural forest resource management system established
- 4.3 Territorial planning mechanisms at community level introduced
- 4.4 Agro forestry practices introduced and applied at the community level
- 4.5 Multi-purpose integrated water resource management systems created

4.6 Sustainable conservation agriculture practices introduced and efficiency in small scale irrigation systems improved

4.7 Prospects of biogas generation and composting using waste manure as coping mechanisms to climate variability determined

Outcome 5. Communities' livelihood options diversified

Outputs

- 5.1 Options for livelihood diversification identified
- 5.2 Inventory and feasibility assessment of potential renewable energy sources carried out
- 5.3 Animal husbandry grazing and veterinary service coverage improved
- 5.4 Agro-processing and marketing activities developed
- 5.5 Use of animal traction promoted to encourage land preparation and transport

#### b. The Programme and the MDGs

#### **Supporting MDG goals**

The Joint Programme (JP) will directly contribute to the realization of the following MDG goals:

Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. This is being achieved through the promotion of a range of activities designed to increase the adaptive ability of rural communities to climate change and increase and diversify income and food sources. For example, the Joint Programme is promoting improved agricultural practices, introducing a range of drought tolerant crops, improving irrigation and water



supply, improving animal treatment facilities and services and promoting better livestock keeping practices.

Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women. 60% of the agricultural land in Chicualacuala is worked by women. Women harvest a range of forest products for food and/or sale. Given the strong linkages between women and the environment, the JP is focusing its environmental conservation activities to ensure the full participation of women at all stages.

Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability. In coordination with target communities and local government, the Joint Programme has developed and is and helping to implement a community based forest management plan designed to reduce pressure on existing forest resources and diversify income from forest products. The promotion of conservation agriculture is designed to improve soil quality and fertility. A grazing plan for livestock is being developed that will help reduce degradation of grazing and forest resources in the JP target area.

#### **Contributing to MDG goals**

The Joint Programme (JP) will directly contribute to the realization of the following MDG goals:

Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. This is being achieved through the promotion of a range of activities designed to increase the adaptive ability of rural communities to climate change and increase and diversify income and food sources. For example, the Joint Programme is promoting improved agricultural practices, introducing a range of drought tolerant crops, improving irrigation and water supply, promoting conservation agriculture, improving animal treatment facilities and services and promoting better livestock keeping practices.

Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women. 60% of the agricultural land in the district in which the JP operates (Chicualacuala) is worked by women. Women harvest a range of forest products for food and/or sale. Given the strong linkages between women and the environment, the JP is focusing its environmental conservation and agricultural production activities to ensure the full participation of women at all stages.

Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability. In coordination with target communities and local government, the Joint Programme has developed and is and helping to implement a community based forest management plan designed to reduce pressure on existing forest resources and diversify income from forest products. The promotion of conservation agriculture is designed to improve soil quality and fertility. A land use plan is being developed that will help reduce degradation of grazing and forest resources in the JP target area.

#### c. Programme Status

The programme has been running for 19 months of its 36 month duration. The Majority of the scheduled activities in the first and second year work plans are completed or underway, although some activities are delayed for a number of reasons. One of the main reasons is the complexity of UN procurement procedures for services and equipment, particularly for non-resident agencies.



The Joint Programme is quite complex. Six UN agencies are involved. In addition, government partners include two ministries and two institutes as well as the provincial. Each UN agencies participating in the JP has its particular skills and comparative advantage which it brings to bear on the problems of climate change in the JP area. However, each agency also has many other projects and programmes to manage and focal points for this JP are also focal points for various other programmes. This means that they are overworked and sometimes do not have time to provide the required back up and support to the Programme Coordinator.

The programme has two main components

- 1. Environment and climate change mainstreamin
- 2. Adaptation to climate change

The first component is mainly capacity building and takes place at the national, provincial and district level. The targeted beneficiaries are mainly government staff, civil society groups and rural community leaders.

The second component focuses more specifically on the effects of climate change in Chicualacuala district and works directly with rural communities, assisting them to adapt and diversify their livelihood and coping strategies to become more resilient to climate change.

The JP operates within a socio-economic context characterized by extreme poverty and hardship for the majority of the direct beneficiaries. Chicualacuala district is one of the driest districts in the country where food insecurity is a norm and income opportunities from off-farm activities are extremely limited. The effects of climate change mainly manifest themselves as prolonged droughts, sometimes for several years without good rain. The older persons in the communities perceive that the climate is changing and that the rains come later and in less quantity than before. As part of coping strategies, the young men migrate to the cities or the mines and farms of South Africa in search of work and remittances are an important part of the local economy. The incidence of HIV/SIDA is very high in Gaze province, affecting roughly one in five of the economically active population.

The budget for the JP is \$ 7,000,000 divided between the six UN agencies as follows:



Programme Budget (from the MDG- F)

FAO USD 2,535,001;

UNEP USD 1,350,000;

UNHABITAT USD 1,180,000;

UNIDO USD 1,019,999;

UNDP USD 700,000;

WFP USD 275,000.

Total USD 7,000,000

Human resources are as indicated in the table below:

UN Agency	National staff		International staff	
	Operation	Programme	Operation	Programme
FAO	1	10	0	1/4
UNDP	1/4	1	0	1/4
UNIDO	1/4	11/2	0	1/4
WFP	1	4	0	0
HABITAT	3	3	2	3
UNEP	1/2	1/2	1/10	4/10

The main programme implementation partners are as follow:

- FAO, UNIDO, PMA, UNIDO, HABITAT, UNEP
- MICOA, Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Actions
- MINAG, Ministry of Agriculture
- INAM, National Meteorological Institute
- INGC, National Disaster Management Institute
- ME, Ministry of energy
- Provincial Government of Gaza



- District Government of Chicualacuala
- Rural communities in Chicualacuala

The programme itself has not changed. There have been no requests made for revisions to date. Changes noted in the programme since implementation began include:

- increased participation of government partners in the PMC meetings and in the implementation of programme activities,
- better, more effective communication and coordination between UN agencies and between UN agencies and government partners
- the development of a sound working relationship between programme staff and target communities,
- improved planning capacity of provincial and district government partners,
- increased community participation in district development planning,
- increased community perception of the need for sustainable forest resource management
- the adoption by target communities of a range of new (for them) techniques linked to conservation agriculture, irrigation and food processing.

#### d. The Programme and the UNDAF

The JP falls within the UNDAF pillar 'Economic Development'. It directly contributes to the following UNDAF outcomes:

1. By 2009, Government and Civil Society Organisations capacity at the national, provincial and district level strengthened to plan, implement and monitor socio-economic development in a transparent, accountable equitable and participatory way to achieve the MDG's.

It does this by sensitizing and providing training at all levels in aspects linked to environment and climate change adaptation, ensuring the integration of environment, risk reduction management and climate change in plans, policies and strategies and supporting the implementation of these plans.

4. Increased and equitable economic opportunities to ensure sustainable livelihoods for women and men.

The livelihood options for target communities are enhanced through improvements in water quality and supply, promotion of renewable energies and the introduction of a range of income earning and marketing options linked to livestock, agriculture and forests.

e. The programme and National Development Goals



The JP directly supports the National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA, 2007) of the Ministry for the Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA) whose overall goal (purpose) is to strengthen national capacity to cope with the adverse effects of climate change. NAPA has 4 main action areas as follows:

- 1 Strengthening of an early warning system
- 2 Strengthening the capacity of agricultural producers to cope with climate change
- 3 Reduction of climate change impacts in coastal zones
- 4 Management of water resources under climate change

The activities being carried out by the JP relate directly to actions 1, 2 and 4 of the Napa Plan of Action.

The JP contributes directly to "economic development" in Mozambique which is one of the three pillars of the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA {II, 2006-2009). It does this by carrying out activities specifically designed to "increase per capita income from economic activities, particularly in rural areas, improving in this way the well-being, specially of the poor", one of the expected outcomes of economic development.

### 3. OVERALL GOAL OF THE EVALUATION

One of the roles of the Secretariat is to monitor and evaluate the MDGF. This role is fulfilled in line with the instructions contained in the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy and the Implementation Guide for Joint Programmes under the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund. These documents stipulate that all joint programmes lasting longer than two years will be subject to an mid-term evaluation.

Mid-term evaluations are highly formative in nature and seek **improved implementation of the programmes during their second phase of implementation**. They also seek and generate knowledge, identifying best practices and lessons learned that could be transferred to other programmes. As a result, the conclusions and recommendations generated by this evaluation will be addressed to its main users: the Programme Management Committee, the National Steering Committee and the Secretariat of the Fund.

#### 4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND SPECIFIC GOALS

The mid-term evaluation will use an expedited process to carry out a systematic, fast-paced analysis of the design, process and results or results trends of the **joint programme**, based on the scope and criteria included in these terms of reference. This will enable conclusions and recommendations for the joint programme to be formed within a period of approximately three months.

The unit of analysis or object of study for this mid-term evaluation is the joint programme, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation.

This mid-term evaluation has the following **specific objectives**:

1. To discover the programme's **design quality and internal coherence** (needs and problems it seeks to solve) and its external coherence with the UNDAF, the National Development Strategies



and the **Millennium Development Goals**, and find out the degree of national ownership as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.

- 2. To understand how the joint programme **operates** and assess the **efficiency of its management model** in planning, coordinating, managing and executing resources allocated for its implementation, through an analysis of its procedures and institutional mechanisms. This analysis will seek to uncover the factors for success and limitations in inter-agency tasks within the **One UN** framework.
- 3. To identify the programme's **degree of effectiveness** among its participants, its contribution to the objectives of the **Environment and Climate Change thematic window**, and the Millennium Development Goals at the local and/or country level.

#### 5. EVALUATION QUESTIONS, LEVELS AND CRITERIA

The evaluation questions define the information that must be generated as a result of the evaluation process. The questions are grouped according to the criteria to be used in assessing and answering them. These criteria are, in turn, grouped according to the three levels of the programme.

#### Design level

- Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country, the Millennium Development Goals and the policies of associates and donors.
- a) Is the assumed problem and its causes in the joint programme being addressed? (Environmental and human)
- b) Does the joint programme address the problem's most salient, urgent and prioritized causes? Does it address the environmental and socio-economic needs of the population in the areas of involvement? Does it reflect the role of the Programme in solving problems and meeting identified needs?
- c) Is the strategy adapted to the socio-cultural context to which it is applied?
- d) Are the monitoring indicators relevant? Are they of sufficient quality to measure the joint programme's outputs and outcomes?
- e) To what extent has the MDGF Secretariat contributed to improving the quality of the formulation of joint programmes?

# 1. Ownership in the design: national social actors' effective exercise of leadership in the development interventions

- a) To what extent do the joint programme's goals and lines of action reflect national and regional plans and programmes, identified needs (environmental and human) and the operational context of national policy?
- b) To what degree have national and local authorities and social actors been taken into consideration in designing the development intervention?



#### **Process level**

# - Efficiency: The extent to which the resources/inputs (funds, time etc.) have been turned into results

- a) Does the design of the programme facilitate the management of the programme including its monitoring and evaluation?
- b) How well does the joint programme's management model that is, its tools, financial resources, human resources, technical resources, organizational structure, information flows and management decision-making contribute to generating the expected outputs and outcomes?
- c) Does the pace of implementing programme outputs ensure the completeness of the joint programme's results?
- d) Are work methodologies, financial tools etc. shared among agencies and among joint programmes?
- e) Have the most efficient measures for the context been adopted to solve the environmental issue?

# - Ownership in the process: National social actors' effective exercise of leadership in the development interventions

- f) To what extent have the target participants taken ownership of the programme, assuming an active role in it?
- g) To what extent have national public/private resources and/or counterparts been mobilized to contribute to the programme's goals and impacts?

#### **Results level**

# - Efficacy: Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been met or are expected to be met, taking into account their relative importance.

- h) Is the programme making progress towards achieving the stipulated results?
  - a. To what extent and in what ways is the joint programme contributing to the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels?
  - b. To what extent is the programme contributing to the goals set by the thematic window, and in what ways?
- i) Is the stipulated timeline of outputs being met?
- j) Do the outputs produced meet the required quality?
- k) Is the programme providing coverage to participants as planned?
- 1) What factors are contributing to progress or delay in achieving outputs and outcomes?
- m) To what extent has the programme contributed innovative measures towards solving the problems?
- n) Have any success stories been identified, or examples that could be transferred to other contexts?
- o) To what extent have the behaviours causing the environmental problem been transformed?



- p) To what extent has the joint programme contributed to putting environmental problems on the country's policy agenda?
- q) What differential impacts and types of effect is the joint programme producing among rural populations disaggregated by gender?

#### Sustainability: The probability that the benefits of the intervention will continue in the long term.

- a) Are the necessary preconditions being created to ensure the sustainability of the impacts of the joint programme?
  - i. At the local level: are local knowledge, experiences, resources and local networks being adopted?
  - ii. At the country level: have networks or network institutions been created or strengthened to carry out the roles that the joint programme is performing?
  - iii. Is the joint programme's duration sufficient to ensure a cycle that will project the sustainability of the interventions into the future?
- b) To what extent are the visions and actions of partners consistent with or different from those of the joint programme?
- c) In what ways can governance of the joint programme be improved so as to increase the chances of achieving sustainability in the future?

#### **Country level**

- d) During the analysis of the evaluation, what lessons have been learned, and what best practices can be transferred to other programmes or countries?
- e) To what extent and in what way is the joint programme contributing to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in the country?
- f) To what extent and in which ways are the joint programmes helping make progress towards United Nations reform? One UN
- g) How have the principles for aid effectiveness (ownership, alignment, managing for development results and mutual accountability) been developed in the joint programmes?
- h) To what extent is the joint programme helping to influence the country's public policy framework?

#### 6. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The mid-term evaluations will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the questions set out in the TOR, the availability of resources and the priorities of stakeholders. In all cases, consultants are expected to analyse all relevant information sources, such as annual reports, programme documents, internal review reports, programme files, strategic country development documents and any other documents that may provide evidence on which to form opinions. Consultants are also expected to use interviews as a means to collect relevant data for the evaluation.

The methodology and techniques to be used in the evaluation should be described in detail in the desk study report and the final evaluation report, and should contain, at a minimum, information on the instruments used for data collection and analysis, whether these be documents, interviews, field visits, questionnaires or participatory techniques.



#### 7. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The consultant is responsible for submitting the following deliverables to the Secretariat of the MDGF:

Inception Report (to be submitted within seven days of the submission of all programme documentation to the consultant)

This report will be 5 to 10 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. It will also include a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables. The desk study report will propose an initial theory of change to the joint programme that will be used for comparative purposes during the evaluation and will serve as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the consultant and the evaluation managers.

**Draft Final Report** (to be submitted within 10 days of completion of the field visit)

The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragrap) and will be 20 to 30 pages in length. This report will be shared among the evaluation reference group. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be shared with evaluation reference group to seek their comments and suggestions.

**Final Evaluation Report** (to be submitted within seven days of receipt of the draft final report with comments)

The final report will be 20 to 30 pages in length. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be sent to the evaluation reference group. This report will contain the following sections at a minimum:

#### 1. Cover Page

#### 2. Introduction

- Background, goal and methodological approach
- Purpose of the evaluation
- Methodology used in the evaluation
- Constraints and limitations on the study conducted
- 3. Description of interventions carried out
  - - Initial concept
  - - Detailed description of its development: description of the hypothesis of change in the programme.
- 4. Levels of Analysis: Evaluation criteria and questions
- 5. Conclusions and lessons learned (prioritized, structured and clear)
- 6. Recommendations



7. Annexes

### 8. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES OF THE EVALUATION

The mid-term evaluation of the joint programme is to be carried out according to ethical principles and standards established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).

• Anonymity and confidentiality. The evaluation must respect the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.

• **Responsibility**. The report must mention any dispute or difference of opinion that may have arisen among the consultants or between the consultant and the heads of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/or recommendations. The team must corroborate all assertions, or disagreement with them noted.

• **Integrity.** The evaluator will be responsible for highlighting issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is needed to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.

• **Independence**. The consultant should ensure his or her independence from the intervention under review, and he or she must not be associated with its management or any element thereof.

• **Incidents**. If problems arise during the fieldwork, or at any other stage of the evaluation, they must be reported immediately to the Secretariat of the MDGF. If this is not done, the existence of such problems may in no case be used to justify the failure to obtain the results stipulated by the Secretariat of the MDGF in these terms of reference.

• Validation of information. The consultant will be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected while preparing the reports and will be ultimately responsible for the information presented in the evaluation report.

• **Intellectual property.** In handling information sources, the consultant shall respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities that are under review.

• **Delivery of reports.** If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than what was agreed, the penalties stipulated in these terms of reference will be applicable.

#### 9. ROLES OF ACTORS IN THE EVALUATION

The main actors in the interim evaluation process are the Secretariat of the MDGF, the management team of the joint programme and the Programme Management Committee that could be expanded to accommodate additional relevant stakeholders. This group of institutions and individuals will serve as the



evaluation reference group. The role of the evaluation reference group will extend to all phases of the evaluation, including:

- Facilitating the participation of those involved in the evaluation design.
- Identifying information needs, defining objectives and delimiting the scope of the evaluation.
- Providing input on the evaluation planning documents, (Work Plan and Communication, Dissemination and Improvement Plan).
- Providing input and participating in the drafting of the Terms of Reference.
- Facilitating the evaluation team's access to all information and documentation relevant to the intervention, as well as to key actors and informants who should participate in interviews, focus groups or other information-gathering methods.
- Monitoring the quality of the process and the documents and reports that are generated, so as to enrich these with their input and ensure that they address their interests and needs for information about the intervention.
- Disseminating the results of the evaluation, especially among the organizations and entities within their interest group.

The Secretariat of the MDGF shall promote and manage Joint Programme mid-term evaluation in its role as proponent of the evaluation, fulfilling the mandate to conduct and finance the joint programme evaluation. As manager of the evaluation, the Secretariat will be responsible for ensuring that the evaluation process is conducted as stipulated, promoting and leading the evaluation design; coordinating and monitoring progress and development in the evaluation study and the quality of the process. It shall also support the country in the main task of disseminating evaluation findings and recommendations.

#### **10. TIMELINE FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS**

#### A. Design phase (15 days total)

1. Each of the Secretariat's portfolios managers shall send the generic TOR for the window in question to the specific country where the evaluation take place. These are then to be adapted to the concrete situation of the joint programme in that country, using the lowest common denominator that is shared by all, for purposes of data aggregation and the provision of evidence for the rest of the MDGF levels of analysis (country, thematic window and MDGF).

This activity requires a dialogue between the Secretariat and the reference group of the evaluation (the body that comments on and reviews but does not interfere with the independent evaluation process). This dialogue should be aimed at rounding out and modifying some of the questions and dimensions of the study that the generic TOR do not cover, or which are inadequate or irrelevant to the joint programme.

- 2. The TOR will be sent to the MDG-F Secretariat consultant.
- 3. From this point on, each programme officer is responsible for managing the execution of the evaluation, with three main functions: to facilitate the work of the consultant, to serve as



interlocutor between the parties (consultant, joint programme team in the country, etc.), and to review the deliverables that are produced.

#### B. Execution phase of the evaluation study (55-58 days total)

#### Desk study (15 days total)

- 1. Briefing with the consultant (1 day). A checklist of activities and documents to review will be submitted, and the evaluation process will be explained. Discussion will take place over what the evaluation should entail.
- 2. Review of documents according to the standard list (see TOR annexes; programme document, financial, monitoring reports etc.).
- 3. Submission of the inception report including the findings from the document review specifying how the evaluation will be conducted. The inception report is sent and shared with the evaluation reference group for comments and suggestions (within **seven days of delivery of all programme documentation to the consultant**).
- 4. The focal person for the evaluation (joint programme coordinator, resident coordinator office, etc) and the consultant prepare and agenda to conduct the field visit of the evaluation. (Interview with programme participants, stakeholders, focus groups, etc) (Within seven days of delivery of the desk study report).

#### Field visit (9-12 days)

- The consultant will travel to the country to observe and contrast the preliminary conclusions reached through the study of the document revision. The planned agenda will be carried out. To accomplish this, the Secretariat's programme officer may need to facilitate the consultant's visit by means of phone calls and emails, making sure there is a focal person in the country who is his/her natural interlocutor by default.
- 2. The consultant will be responsible for conducting a debriefing with the key actors he or she has interacted with.

#### **Final Report (31 days total)**

- 1. The consultant will deliver a draft final report, which the Secretariat's programme officer shall be responsible for sharing with the evaluation reference group (within 10 days of the completion of the field visit).
- 2. The evaluation reference group may ask that data or facts that it believes are incorrect be changed, as long as it provides data or evidence that supports its request. The evaluator will have the final say over whether to accept or reject such changes. For the sake of evaluation



quality, the Secretariat's programme officer can and should intervene so that erroneous data, and opinions based on erroneous data or not based on evidence, are changed (within seven days of delivery of the draft final report).

The evaluation reference group may also comment on the value judgements contained in the evaluation, but these may not affect the evaluator's freedom to express the conclusions and recommendations he or she deems appropriate, based on the evidence and criteria established.

- 3. The Secretariat's programme officer shall assess the quality of the evaluation reports presented using the criteria stipulated in the annex to this evaluation strategy (within seven days of delivery of the draft final report).
- 4. On the completion of input from the reference group, the evaluator shall decide which input to incorporate and which to omit. The Secretariat's programme officer shall review the final copy of the report, and this phase will conclude with the delivery of this report to the evaluation reference group in the country (within seven days of delivery of the draft final report with comments).

# C. Phase of incorporating recommendations and improvement plan (within seven days of delivery of the final report):

- 1. The Secretariat's programme officer, as representative of the Secretariat, shall engage in a dialogue with the joint programme managers to establish an improvement plan that includes recommendations from the evaluation.
- 2. The Secretariat's programme officer will hold a dialogue with the point person for the evaluation to develop a simple plan to disseminate and report the results to the various interested parties.

### **11. ANNEXES**

#### a) Document Review

#### MDG-F Context

- 2. MDGF Framework Document
- 3. Summary of the M&E frameworks and common indicators
- 4. General thematic indicators
- 5. M&E strategy
- 6. Communication and Advocacy Strategy
- 7. MDG-F Joint Implementation Guidelines

Specific Joint Programme Documents

- 8. Joint Programme Document: results framework and monitoring and evaluation framework
- 9. Mission report from the Secretariat



- 10. Quarterly reports
- 11. Mini-monitoring reports
- 12. Biannual monitoring reports
- 13. Annual reports
- 14. Annual work plan
- 15. Financial information (MDTF)

Other in-country documents or information

- 16. Evaluations, assessments and internal reports conducted by the joint programme
- 17. Relevant reports on One UN, Delivering as One

#### b) File for the Joint Programme Improvement Plan

After the interim evaluation is complete, the phase of incorporating its recommendations shall begin. This file is to be used as the basis for establishing an improvement plan for the joint programme, which will bring together all the recommendations, actions to be carried out by programme management.

Evaluation Recommendation No. 1					
Response from the Joint Programme Management					
Key actions	Key actionsTime framePersonFollow-upresponsible				
1.1			Comments	Status	
1.2					
1.3					
Evaluation Recommendation No. 2					
Response from the Joint Programme Management					
Key actions	Time framePersonFollow-upresponsible			v-up	
2.1			Comments	Status	
2.2					
2.3					
Evaluation Recommendation No. 3					
Response from the Joint Programme Management					



Key actions	Time frame	Person responsible	Follo	w-up
3.1			Comments	Status
3.2				
3.3				



Annex 2: Field visit calendar and people met



Date		Place	Meeting	
17/6	14h00	Maputo, FAO	M. David e Silva, FAO Deputy Resident Representative S. Gomes FAO Operations Officer A. Mattick, UNJP Coordinator, FAO focal Point	
18/6	9h00	Maputo, FAO	N. Vaz, Disaster Management & Food Security Officer, WFP I. Kreisler, UNDP Climate Change Programme Analyst M. Muianga, UNHABITAT Programme Officer F. Ferreiro, UNHABITAT Programme Officer A. Menezes, UNEP National Officer	
	14h00	Maputo, FAO	M. Manjate, Study & Research Department Chief – INGC D. M. Patricio, INAM S. Chaile, INAM I. José, Energy & Transport Ministry E. Nhachongue, MICOA	
18/6	10h00	Xai Xai, Provincial Directorate of Agriculture	M. Beca, Forestry Officer, DPA A. Zimba, Forestry Officer, DPA Mr. Chemani, DPCA Officer F. Jaquicene, IN-Caju Officer D. Dolo, SPA Officer	
	12h00	Xai Xai, Provincial Administration	I. Kreisler, UNDP Programme Analyst A. Vaz Teresa, Decentralised Planning Assessor C. Tembe, Planning Technician A. Chambale, Planning Technician Provincial Planning Team members	
20/6	AM & PM	Travel to E. Mondlane	A. Menezes, UNEP National Officer	
21/6	8h00	E. Mondlane, UNJP Office	F. Campos, FAO – Forestry Officer S. Chacha, FAO – Technician I. Muedane, UN-HABITAT Technician A. Tembe, WFP Monitor	
	9h00	E. Mondlane, District Administration	M. Beca, Forestry Officer, DPA R. Nhacuongo, District Administrator	
	11h00	E. Mondlane, District Administration	District Technical Team: J. Foleque, Technical Team Chief J. Monhamo, District Planning Chief H. Mubai, Chief Finance G. Munguambe, Planning Team Technician - Education A. Massango, Planning Team Technician – Education A. Moamba, Chief Administration	
	12h00	E. Mondlane, SDAE	M. Namburete, SDAE Director C. Ricardo, Extension Supervisor	
	14h00	E. Mondlane, Agro-veterinary shop	Local Manager in Charge of shop	
	PM	E. Mondlane, Individual cisterns visit	Final beneficiaries	
	PM	E. Mondlane, Community / school cisterns potential sites	School Director	



	PM	E. Mondlane, UNJP Office	F. Campos, FAO – Forestry Officer
	1 111	E. Mondiane, ONJI Office	S. Chacha, FAO – Technician
			I. Muedane, UN-HABITAT Technician
			A. Tembe, WFP Monitor
22/6	AM	Travel to Mahatlane	G. Muai, WFP Monitoring & Evaluation Officer
	AM	Mahatlane - Associação Camponesa Agropecuaria de Mahatlane & tree nursery visit	Farmers Association Committee members
	AM	Mahatlane	Lifestock Promoter
	AM	Mahatlane	Female Farmers beneficiaries
	PM	Mahatlane	Teachers benefitting from Environmental Training
	PM	Mahatlane	UNAC Project Chief and Assistants
22/6	PM	Mahatlane – E. Mondlane	I. Muedane, UN-HABITAT Technician
	PM	E. Mondlane	A. Agostinho, District Chief Infrastructures, Mineral Resources, Environment & Transport
23/6	AM	Madulo	Sr. Sarmento, Livestock Promoter
	AM	Madulo	Staff of the Madulo (farmers') Development Association
	AM	Madulo	Final beneficiaries (female)
	PM	Ndombé	President, Vice-President, Secretary & Treasurer of farmers' association "Força da Mudança"
	PM	Ndombé	Final beneficiaries (female)
	PM	Ndombé	F. Caixote, Chókwè Aquaculture Technician
24/6	AM	Mapuvule	Final beneficiaries (male) including farmers' association president
	AM	Mapuvule	Final beneficiaries (female)
	PM	Chissapa	Livestock Promoter
	PM	Chissapa	Final beneficiaries (male & female)
	PM	Мараі	S. F. Cossa, <i>Chefe de Posto</i> of Mapai
	PM	Mapai	E. Laquene, Mapai Community Leader



	PM	Mapai	Members of the Conselho Consultivo
25/6		Mapai – Maputo	
28/6	8h30	Maputo – Spain Embassy	E. Lopez Busquet, Embassador of Spain
	10h30	Maputo – RCO	N. Vaz, Disaster Management & Food Security Officer, WFP I. Kreisler, UNDP Programme Analyst M. Muianga, UNHABITAT Programme Officer F. Ferreiro, UNHABITAT Programme Officer A. Mattick, UNJP Coordinator, FAO focal Point
	12h00	Maputo – FAO	I UNJP, MDG-f Programme Assistant Coordinator
	14h00	Maputo – WFP	L. Castro, WFP Representative & Country Director
	15h00	Maputo – FAO	S. Gomes, FAO Operation Officer
	16h00	Maputo – UN-Habitat	M. Muianga, UNHABITAT Programme Officer F. Ferreiro, UNHABITAT Programme Officer
29/6	11h00	Maputo - INAM	A. J. Manhique, Deputy National Director INAM D. M. Patricio, INAM S. Chaile, INAM
	15h00	Maputo - UNIDO	J. Comiche, Head of UNIDO Operations
30/6	8h30	Maputo - MICOA	E. Nhachongue, National Director, MICOA
	10h30	Maputo - MINAG	E. Macome, Head of Policy Analysis Department - Directorate of Economics
1/7	13h00	Maputo - AECID	Sr. C. Perez, AECID programme officer
2/7	9h00	Maputo - RCO	Debriefing with UN & Gov focal points



Annex 3: Detailed methodological approach



#### Methodological approach of the evaluation

Several basic principles have been used to carry out this evaluation:

- Effective participation of all stakeholders (government, agencies, communities including male / female interviews)
- Crosschecking of gathered information (a check-list of issues to review was produced prior to arrival by the consultant).
- Pushing for consensus and agreement of recommendations by the stakeholders.
- Transparency of debriefing (all programme stakeholders are convened to the debriefing).

The consultant has elaborated a checklist of issues to be investigated during the field mission and prepared questionnaires.

The check-list structures the field mission:

- 1. Which information to gather?
- 2. Where to get it (from whom ? which different sources of information for cross reference),
- 3. How to gather it (which appropriate tools? Interview, report, focus group, individual interviews, government data, etc.)?


Field mission check-list objectives

A 4 step approach has been adopted to carry out the evaluation: 1. passive data acquisition, 2. active data acquisition, 3. data analysis into relevant information and 4. Information interpretation,

- 1. Passive data acquisition: documentary analysis: analysis of PRODOC, UNDP & partners' agency country programs, periodic planning and M&E reports, annual programme reports, etc.). During this phase, the consultants elaborated a checklist detailing for each evaluation topic how and from whom to obtain relevant information. Beneficiaries' questionnaires were drafted from the checklist.
- 2. Active data acquisition: interviews of all stakeholders through individual/group interviews of final beneficiaries, institutional beneficiaries, implementation stakeholders, external stakeholders; the interviews (number, target, duration) are stemmed from the checklist.
  - In situ sampling of subprojects & interviews of beneficiaries with an emphasis on increased resilience, CC adaptation
  - Interviews of implementation partners (UN agencies, INGC, INAM, MICOA, etc.) to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation
  - Open discussion with external stakeholders (to be defined on arrival) active in the project area and/or in the environment sector



- **3. Data analysis**: conversion of data into relevant information to assess the programme status and for decision making by the Secretariat, NSC & PMC; inclusion of the information into the evaluation report proposal for recommendations.
- **4. Presentation** and **discussion of findings** to all stakeholders; debriefing sessions were carried out at the end of the mission in Maputo.



Methodological framework for the programme evaluation – field mission

As with rapid evaluations like this one (6 days of fieldwork anticipated), no statistically significant findings was produced; hence the importance of cross-checking through interview & data collection of various stakeholders.



Annex 4: PowerPoint presentation at the debriefing



#### Mid term evaluation team of MDG-f:

"Environmental mainstreaming & adaptation to climate change in Mozambique"

presentation of preliminary findings

We thank you for keeping your phones in silent mode

#### Introduction

#### Rapid evaluation goals:

- Review the 5 outcomes: sensitization, GOV capacity building, climate proofing, community resilience, livelihood diversification

- Relevance re. MDG goals
- Key lessons learned
- Best practices



### Methodology

#### **Principles:**

- Effective stakeholders participation
- Crosschecking info
- Transparency
  - 1. Doc review
  - 2. Multilateral interviews
  - 3. Field mission : beneficiaries
  - 4. Bilateral interviews
  - 5. Data  $\rightarrow$  information
  - 6. Selected information  $\rightarrow$  recommendations

# Main findings

#### Achievements to date

- 18 studies (baselines, district plans, inventories, feasibility studies re. to natural resources, vulnerability & risk mapping...)

- Mainstreaming into GOV: Cristal →PEDD / CC guide, ESAN2

- CC vulnerability assessment: risk mapping  $\rightarrow$  district planning (ongoing)
- Forestry management plan (→ charcoal quotas)
- Energy diversification (→ selected biogas sites)
   Good collaboration of GOV into studies



# **Main findings**

Achievements to date – on site - Successful awareness raising of communities on NRM

- Reactivation of farmer's associations & livestock promoters (+ shop)

- 13 water tanks (out of 100) + tech. team
- Agric improv / irrig + livestock in 9 villages + nurseries
- Solar panels in 3 villages (1 functional FAO)
- Slaughterhouse construction (ongoing)

Slow progress on all other infrastructures : CERUM, community tanks, solar panels, dams, wells, boreholes, met., RANET, biogas (design, feasibility or procurement phases)

# Main findings

**Rate of implementation** 

SLOW for all agencies: WHY?

- Original programme design
- Remoteness & logistics
- Weak institutional set-up (FAO & MICOA coordination)
- Procurement
- Secretariat reporting requirements changing over time
- Many demo. activities → pilot CC adaptation programme



## **Main findings**

- Programme relevance // GOV priorities: ok →planning activities ++ GOV ; agency & GOV implementation --→ little ownership of results

Programme flexibility : good response to GOV requests (ex. aquaculture, INAM, CERUM → potentially stronger sustainability)

- top-down approach: solutions proposed to communities – pilot activities

- Complementary activities ++ holistic approach + ext. stakeholders
- Dependent activities --
- Local visibility (only FAO)
- Programme not embedded in district structures

# Main findings

NRM awareness + agric. alternatives (intens.+diversif.) = successful strategy to reduce pressure on NR
 So successful → excess production → ?commercialisation? / aquaculture alternative?
 Chissapa → Mapuvule → Ndombé

- Relevance of drip in areas with gravity irrig.

- Poor coordination FAO / UNIDO : Madule (borehole for both irrig / human consumption)

Fast implementation FAO : Madule (borehole + solar panels + drip)



## Main findings

- Poor ownership of communities re. tree nurseries (topdown) / some interest in orchards

- Weak farmers' associations (no notebooks, no regular meetings  $\rightarrow$  informal structures): sustainability?

 ++ copy effect between communities (Madulo or Ndombé → Mapuvule)

- High potential slaughterhouse : Mapai economic centre

### Recommendations

Slow progress in agency delivery  $\rightarrow$  accelerate

Little GOV ownership → improve

High potential for community changes / mainstreaming CC adaptation  $\rightarrow$  increase impact / document methods



### Recommendations

YEAR3:

- Budget revision (1 activity = 1 agency) simplification (ex. swapping activities between agencies for ease of proc.)
- Include GOV priorities (activities and/or capacity building) how? bilateral negoc. each agency // GOV counterpart
- 2. Drop activities for Y3 requiring long procurement procedures

## Recommendations

#### Acceleration:

need to setup program deadlines / milestones for Y3 (e.g. UNIDO, UN-Hab, UNDP)
Improve staff working conditions (e.g. generator)
finalise Y2 activities, then 1 activity / 1 agency
joint monitoring (e.g. monthly – Focal Points): FP on the field > rate of implementation
technical forum (e.g. monthly): identify needs
procurement: reduce gap technical staff // proc committees (e.g. systematic annual proc training – dialogue on reform)
accelerate mainstreaming CC re. activities in Y3 (// UNDP PEDD) (e.g. climate proofing UNEP ; district land use / water resources plan UN-HAB) + divulgation of training tools (testing → GOV appropriation)



### Recommendations

#### Increase GOV ownership:

- review local GOV activity inputs

- local staff embedded within SDAE

- increase use of GOV prov./national expertise (e.g. IIAM, water engineers...) – GOV backstopping

- approximation between FAO coordination & MICOA coordination (MICOA HR counterpart available + move to MICOA premises) :

- added value?  $\rightarrow$  MICOA as facilitator in mainstreaming / GOV appropriation

- need for more delegation by coordinator // coordination <> FAO FP

#### Recommendations

#### Increase impact / sustainability:

- 6 months (no cost) extension to allow for ex-post monitoring
- / benef. capacity building (re. onsite results)
- Expansion of current agric. schemes
- "Associativismo"
- -Tree nurseries: focus on food / income (not on reforestation)
- ; targeting : children + dire envir situations
- Increase community visits rate

- Increase demo effect of individual cisterns (abandon free distribution  $\rightarrow$  community cisterns)

- Networking of livestock promoters // agro-shop



### Recommendations

- Increase visibility immediately for studies ; after Y2 onsite results completion

#### Success stories:

Relevant methodologies / approaches : only combined (ex. FAO + UNEP + UN-Hab)

→need to document at program's end – pilot program
 →GOV appropriation
 →replication potential

#### **Lessons learned**

#### UN as 1 in this program:

- JP program formulation: output oriented NEVER activity oriented → complementarities but individual implementation

- procurement procedures negatively affecting delivery: (inside / outside?) reform <u>necessary</u>

 - external implementation → poor GOV ownership / results sustainability
 →JP & GOV capacity building (= UN core business)

→direct implementation: embedded into GOV structures



### **Lessons learned**

Good program formulation paramount:

- Avoid weak institutional setups (e.g. FAO/MINAG UNEP/MICOA; MICOA weakly represented at local level)
- Avoid pilot program + remoteness
- Holistic approach necessary to have impact on NRM

#### THANK YOU

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Annex 5: Local and national contribution of programme activities to the MDGs



Goal	Target	Output	Potential contribution by programme's end based on current results
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty & hunger	Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1 a day	Output 1.4: Knowledge and experience sharing within the different groups (UN implementing agencies and beneficiaries) Output 4.4: Agro forestry practices introduced and applied at the community level Output 4.6: Sustainable conservation agriculture practices introduced and efficiency in small scale irrigation systems improved Output 5.3: Animal husbandry grazing and veterinary service coverage improved Output 5.5: Use of animal traction promoted to encourage land preparation and transport	Strong potential multiplication effect between communities & competition effect Positive response from farmers for fruit trees; negative response re. reforestation Main programme pillar for agricultural development (intensification & expansion) as an alternative to unsustainable use of natural resources; good empowerment of results (especially men at this stage of implementation) Very similar activity as to what was carried out by other donors in the past ; innovation through networking and creation of livestock pharmacy No on-site information
	Target 2: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people	Output 5.1: Options for livelihood diversification identified Output 5.4: Agro-processing and marketing activities developed	In due course (?) ; little on-site information available Under way ; great potential for livestock (slaughterhouse)
Goal 2: Achieve Universal Education	Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	Not relevant	
Goal 3: Achieve gender equity	Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015	Not directly addressed by the programme	
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality	Target 5: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate	Not relevant	
Goal 5: Improve maternal health	Target 6: Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio	Not relevant	
	Target 7: Achieve universal access to reproductive health	Not relevant	
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases	Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	Not relevant	
	Target 9: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it	Not relevant	
	Target 10: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and	Not relevant	



	other major diseases		
Goal 7: Ensure	Target 11:		
Environment Sustainability	Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	Output 1.1: 1.1 Environment priorities and indicators reflected in planning frameworks and budgets at district and community level Output 1.2: GIS-based data and maps on	Results already included within some national (SETSAN) & local (PEDD, PASAN) policies / strategies Results will be integrated within the
		climate change vulnerability for risk areas Output 1.3: Training programmes on disaster and climate change prediction, including interpretation of maps and application of monitoring data for early	national disaster early warning system Trainings completed but hardware installation lagging behind (INAM)
		warning purposes Output 4.1: Inventory of strategies and coping mechanisms currently in use by communities and in the Limpopo River Basin	Inventories completed ; strategies to be completed by year 2
	Target 12: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss	Output 4.2: Community based natural forest resource management system established	Land use plans established ; 25% adoption rate so far ; potential for improvements with regular periodic environmental awareness activities
	Target 13: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation	Output 4.5: Multi purpose integrated water resource management systems created	Possibly the most important pillar of the programme ; most delayed as well ; might need downscaling towards more demonstration effect
	Target 14: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers	Output 4.3: Territorial planning mechanisms at community level introduced	Improved dwelling and shelter roofs under way
Goal 8: Build Partnership for Development	Target 15: Address the special needs of least developed countries, landlocked countries and small island	Output 2.1: National Disaster Preparedness plan and other relevant plans revised/updated to include climate	On course
	developing states	change and environment aspects Output 2.3: Authorities, civil society and other relevant actors trained to incorporate and report on environmental	Slow implementation but on course
		and climate change risk events Output 3.1: Tools for climate proofing of risk zones in the Limpopo River Basin developed Output 3.2: Assessment of climate proofing approaches carried out Output 3.3: Stakeholders trained on climate proofing	Apparently similar thematic to environmental mainstreaming at institutional level; much delay (year 1 $\rightarrow$ to be implemented in year 2)
	Target 16: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system	Not relevant	
	Target 17: Deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt	Not relevant	
	Target 18: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries	Not relevant	



Target 19:		
In cooperation with the pri-	Vate Output 2.2: Early warning and	Dubious results as RANET has been
sector, make available bend	fits of communication system enhanced in the	inoperative since early 2010 (satellite
new technologies, especial	y Gaza province	link cut)
information and communic	ations Output 4.7: Prospects of biogas	Localized potential around high
	generation and composting using waste	livestock concentration areas (e.g.
	manure as coping mechanisms to climate	
	variability determined	raw material over the district
	Output 5.2: Inventory and feasibility	Carried out ; very little implementation
	assessment of potential renewable energy	results visible ; high interest from final
	sources carried out	beneficiaries